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I
INTRODUCTION

Professors Walker and Monahan have coined the term "framework
evidence" to describe "the use of general conclusions from social science
research in determining factual issues in a specific case."' In this article, I
examine the legal doctrines that govern the admissibility of social framework
testimony. My general purpose is to highlight the social science assumptions
undergirding the applicable evidentiary principles and to suggest some
potentially fruitful areas for further empirical research.
I focus principally on the admission of social framework evidence in two
types of cases: sexual abuse of children and rape involving adult female
victims. 2 I analyze the issue under the assumption that the jury is the
3
factfinder.
In this article, I construe the concept of social framework evidence
relatively broadly. 4 My premise is that testimony that relies on a comparison
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1. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559,
570 (1987) (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan]. See also Walker
& Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology, as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988)
[hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Scientific MIethodolog, as Precedent]; Walker & Monahan, Social Authoritv
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law. 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986).
2. Because some of the most sophisticated empirical research has been conducted in the area
of eyewitness identification, I will on occasion use that research to analyze some issues.
3. Because of the widespread assumption that the problem of overvaluation of scientific and
technical evidence is chiefly a problem that affects lay factfinders, I assume throughout this article
that the jury is the factfinder. It should not necessarily be assumed, however, that judges are immune
to the effects of myths and misconceptions, particularly in the highly charged areas of rape and child
sexual abuse. See Massaro, Experts, Pschology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and
Its Implicationsfor Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 468 (1985) (arguing that myths
and fears concerning rape may influence judicial decisions not to admit expert evidence concerning
the rape trauma syndrome).
4. My construction of social framework evidence is broader than that used by Walker and
Monahan. For a more complete discussion of the differences between my construction of social
framework evidence and that of Monahan and Walker and my reasons for a broader construction of
framework evidence, see infra Part Ill.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 52: No. 4

between a participant in the litigation and a larger social grouping possesses
the core element of social framework testimony, regardless of whether the
expert testifies to an explicit framework based on the behavior and
5
characteristics of a group.
As a lawyer, I come to the issues raised in this symposium with a somewhat
different perspective from most of the other participants whose training is in
the social sciences. I am generally familiar and largely comfortable with the
arcane and scientifically suspect legal classifications by which admissibility is
judged. Nevertheless, even lawyers who examine the operation of the legal
6
doctrines in this area may rightfully react with some despair.
The reasons for despair are numerous. First, the doctrines are a jumble.
Although they often rest on some of the concerns that properly should guide
admissibility, these doctrines consist of a series of antiquated tests with their
origins in the common law; they cut one way and then another across the field.
They are defended on the ground that they frequently produce rational,
appropriate results. 7 Admissibility analysis that abandons the common law
doctrines and directly focuses on the core concepts appears, however, to be a
better solution.
Second, neither legal scholars nor social scientists are making significant
progress in resolving the problems in this area. Professor Tribe wrote in
1971 about the difficulties, which he believed were insuperable, of combining
statistical and probabilistic evidence with other types of proof.8 Many of the
issues he identified, and much of the terminology he employed, still dominate
analysis of social framework evidence both in the courts and in legal
scholarship. This is true in spite of substantial research that suggests the
5. My position in this article is that the evidence should be considered under the social
framework rubric even if it is based on a series of clinical observations rather than on systematic
analysis of a substantial data base. See Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 123, 151-54 (1981) (arguing that apparently case-specific
information is only superficially distinct from probabilistic base-rate information). See also Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2, 1360-61
(1971) (acknowledging the fundamental kinship between probabilistic evidence and apparently
specific testimony, but contending that explicitly probabilistic evidence has a vastly greater impact on
the jury because, inter alia, hard numbers dwarf the impact of evidence that is not quantified). In
contrast to Professor Tribe, others suggest that methods of presentation other than the use of
statistics-for example, direct linkage of the social phenomenon to the individual case or a direct
opinion regarding witness credibility-may be as powerful, or perhaps even more powerful, than a
statistical presentation of framework evidence. See infra note 58.
6. See McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony about Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A4
Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 24-26 (1986)
(describing the "unsatisfactory state of the case law" with regard to admissibility analysis); Myers et
al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. I, 5 (1989) (noting that few lawyers
or judges can understand the expanding non-legal literature on child sexual abuse and
recommending an interdisciplinary approach).
7. For example, Professor Lempert argues that the "general acceptance" test of Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), has a basically sound justification: "If psychologists
cannot arrive at a consensus on the value of [psychological] testimony, how can a psychologically
naive judge, whose primary task is to resolve the case in front of him, be expected to value it
properly?" Lempert, Social Science in Court: On "Eyewitness Experts'" and Other Issues, 10 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 167, 175 (1986).
8. Tribe, supra note 5.
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invalidity of Tribe's underlying factual premise that lay jurors would be
overwhelmed by statistical evidence. 9
Third, empirical research is proving of relatively little immediate help to
the courts in making the decision on admissibility. A number of issues play an
important role here, and many of them depend upon factual assumptions that
are subject to empirical examination. Among these issues are:
How reliable is the research concerning the child sexual abuse
and rape trauma syndromes?' 0
How misguided are contemporary public perceptions
concerning the typical reactions of a sexually abused child and an
adult rape victim? I
Is a jury likely to attach relatively too much weight to expert
testimony concerning the social framework characteristics of these
two victim groups?
How does the impact of the expert testimony differ depending
upon whether general research findings are presented or whether a
clinical evaluation of the particular alleged victim is given?
What are the characteristics of expert testimony that make it
particularly susceptible to misuse and overvaluation by a jury
(scientific jargon, statistical evidence, use of apparently sophisticated
hardware, direct testimony by expert about the witness' credibility)?
Are the characteristics that lead to overvaluation of testimony easily
2
generalized from one subject matter area to another?'
How accessible is social science research in these areas to
judicial decisionmakers when they attempt to determine the
reliability of scientific evidence and the impact it is likely to have on
jurors?

13

What is the relative value of social framework evidence,
weighing the benefit of correcting juror ignorance of a social
phenomenon against the likely inappropriate impact of the testimony
upon the jurors? Does social science research have any substantial
chance of answering this final question in the near term?
See Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical Evidence, A Social Science Perspective, in THE
297 (S. Fienberg ed. 1988)
almost all of these studies
draw is that jurors do not give undue weight or credibility to expert evidence."); Walker & Monahan,
supra note 1, at 576 ("It appears that aggregate 'statistical' information, in actual practice, is likely to
be highly undervalued by lay decisionmakers.").
Moreover, lawyers and judges, while purporting to use social science concepts, tend both to use
primitive ideas-often, in fact, erroneous analyses-and to approach the use of such evidence and
the resources offered by the social sciences with considerable skepticism. GoldJury Wobble: Judicial
Tolerance ofJury Inferential Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 395, 399, 402-03 (1986). See also infra note
100. Moreover, the prospect for rapid change is not bright, since the interaction of factors occurring
in litigation is extraordinarily complex and it is likely to be some time before they may be fully and
accurately analyzed.
10. See infra notes 106-07, 165, 174 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 104-05, 118, 165, 174 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 65.
13. See infra note 100.
9.

EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS
[hereinafter EVOLVING ROLE] ("The main conclusion that the authors of
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On some of these issues, researchers have made substantial progress, but
resolution does not appear near at hand for many of them. Probably more
importantly, we may never be able to resolve these issues when they are posed
simultaneously, as generally occurs in the context of actual litigation.
Fourth, what may be termed bias has a disproportionately large impact
upon the outcome of legal analysis concerning the admissibility of social
framework testimony. Courts and lawyers schooled in the craft of lawyering
but not in the social sciences seem all too ready to develop arguments against
using new learning. Similarly, social scientists have their own biases and
feelings about the legal profession's treatment of their field.' 4 In much the
same way that lawyers tend to react negatively to the introduction of new
learning in the courts, social scientists appear too ready to give assurance that
the new learning will have only beneficial effects and can be integrated into
5
the trial process without harm to the process.'
Another important source of bias is the operation of a strong result
orientation that appears to play a major role in determining the admissibility
of social framework evidence. Many types of social framework testimony have
a predictable impact of favoring one side in a particular type of litigation. As a
result, courts making the admissibility decision for a class of testimony may be
swayed by their feelings about what they perceive to be the correct result of
the litigation.
For instance, the criminal defendant is almost always the party who seeks
to admit expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification, apparently
because such testimony is perceived as increasing the prospects for acquittal
in most cases where identification testimony constitutes a significant element
of the state's case.' 6 This perception has at least arguable scientific merit,
14. There is certainly an air of mutual hostility in some of the writings of lawyers and
psychologists concerning each other's role in the legal process and the accurate adjudication of
factual issues. McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibilitv of
NontraditionalPsychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 21-23 (1987).
15. It would not be fair to say that all social scientists take the view that admission of their
expertise will only benefit the trial process. Notably, Professors McCloskey and Egeth argue that, in
the eyewitness area, it is far from clear that testimony by psychologists concerning the problems of
eyewitness identification would improve the ability ofjurors to evaluate such identification evidence.
Expert testimony, they argue, may in fact have detrimental effects on the process. McCloskey &
Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can a Psychologist Tell a jury?, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 550 (1983);
McCloskey & Egeth, A Time to Speak, or a Time to Keep Silent, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 573 (1983). See also
McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, The Experimental Psychologist in Court: The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10
LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 1 (1986).
16. Professor Lempert has argued that justice, defined in terms of the probability of accurate
jury verdicts, will be enhanced if expert testimony in eyewitness identification cases is admitted when
the evidence of guilt, apart from the eyewitness identification testimony, is weak, and excluded when
the other evidence in the case is strong. Lempert, supra note 7, at 170-71. Where the eyewitness
testimony is consistent with a substantial body of other evidence pointing to guilt, he argues that, in a
probabilistic sense, the eyewitness testimony is likely to be accurate. Moreover, in such
circumstances, he believes, the tendency to overvalue eyewitness testimony is corrected by a natural
tendency to undervalue the cumulative impact of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 170.
The admission of eyewitness evidence only when the other evidence of guilt is weak could be
justified because of the likelihood that defense counsel will attempt to overemphasize the
significance of such expert eyewitness testimony. Where the evidence independent of the eyewitness
testimony is strong, the defense may be able artificially to focus the jury's attention on the weakness
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since some research indicates that expert testimony does not help mock jurors
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness testimony. Instead, a
major impact of the testimony is to increase the tendency of jurors to
disbelieve eyewitness testimony, with the result that mock jurors may give it
less weight than the empirical results indicate it warrants.' 7
of the eyewitness testimony by attacking that testimony with the support of expert testimony. If
effectively presented, that attack may diminish the impact of the other evidence by reducing its
apparent significance, producing an erroneous result. Where the other evidence of guilt is weak,
however, there can be little danger of overattention to the weakness of the eyewitness testimony.
Professor Lempert's suggestion usefully explains when some types of framework evidence should
be admissible, but the explanation appears limited to evidence assisting the defendant, as expert
testimony about eyewitness identification generally does. His major argument, which rests upon a
probability assessment, also has a strong due process-type justification and is not derived principally
from evidentiary concerns embodied in the relevancy and helpfulness concepts developed below. See
infra Parts II.B, C.
Where the evidence of the defendant's guilt apart from the eyewitness testimony is weak, due
process, in the sense of fundamental fairness, supports admission of evidence that assists the defense
in attacking eyewitness testimony. The argument is much like that under which reliable hearsay was
admitted in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). Courts have admitted other
evidence, such as the psychiatric examination of an alleged rape victim in Ballard v. Superior Court,
64 Cal. 2d 159, 176-77, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966), under similar arguments.
The courts in these situations appropriately "peek at the merits" in ways that they are typically not
overtly permitted to do, given the dangers that accompany an explicitly result-oriented
jurisprudence.
When the framework evidence is to be admitted against rather than in favor of the defendant,
Professor's Lempert's analysis does not appear to apply. And while courts may use a "necessity"
argument in both situations, as the court did in Ballard, id., to support admission, the meaning of the
term differs according to whether the evidence supports or harms the defense.
The example of framework testimony supporting the credibility of a child witness in a sexual
abuse case illustrates the differences between the two cases. First, if the evidence of guilt,
independent of the testimony of the witness affected by the framework evidence, is weak, Professor
Lempert's probabilistic argument suggests that the child's testimony is likely to be inaccurate and
therefore, if admitted, the framework evidence would be used in support of an erroneous outcome.
This result is the reverse of that in the eyewitness situation and suggests that the evidence should be
excluded. Second, in the child sexual abuse case, necessity in a due-process sense-the sense of
avoiding a fundamentally unfair outcome-does not operate, since the state has no due-process
protection. Third, in the child sexual abuse case, necessity may exist for the evidence in the sense
that there are no alternative ways to establish the same point or reach the same result. In contrast, in
the eyewitness case suggested above, this type of necessity is almost entirely lacking. Given the weak
case for the state, testimony concerning eyewitness fallibility may be entirely unnecessary and the
state's case may be subjected to effective attack in alternative ways precisely because it is otherwise
weak.
Moreover, the argument that supports admissibility of framework testimony in both eyewitness
and child sexual abuse cases has generally limited importance in determining admissibility under
standard evidentiary analysis. Because of the otherwise weak case for the state, the credibility of the
particular witness whose testimony would be affected by the framework evidence will be considered
of sufficient importance to justify the expenditure of considerable time and some substantial
confusion of issues to attack or support it. However, neither consumption of time nor confusion of
issues tends to be high in the hierarchy of concerns that typically lead courts to exclude framework
evidence. Also, the fact that credibility is important does not mean that the danger of juror
overvaluation of the expert's testimony will be reduced. Indeed, such danger may be greater in these
circumstances, and it is the danger of overvaluing the evidence that causes the most concern to
courts about the use of such evidence.
17. Sanders, Expert Witness in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1409,
1459-64 (1986).
Professor Sanders observes that the scientific community makes little note of the fact that it is
producing evidence in the eyewitness area that tends to help only one side. Id. at 1460. He believes,
however, that this issue lurks near the surface of the debate on admissibility. Id. at 1468. Others,
including Professors Penrod and Cutler in their article in this issue, disagree with Sanders' basic
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In child sexual abuse cases, the prosecution is the party that benefits from
the evidence. Currently, child sexual abuse is correctly seen as a major social
problem. As a result of the public perception, social scientists and the courts
are eager to join forces in attacking the problem. I suggest that in this area, as
in eyewitness identification, social framework testimony relevant to the
credibility of an alleged child victim, for example, does not -enable the jurors
premise and argue that the effect of expert testimony is not to produce skepticism. Penrod & Cutler,
Eyewitness Expert Testimony andJury Decisionmaking, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 43. See
also Cutler, Penrod & Drexler, The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and theJury, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
311, 324-26 (1989) (results in mock trial showed expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification increased juror sensitivity to witnessing conditions but did not increase skepticism).
In resolving the issue of whether skepticism is produced, one must confront a definitional
difficulty. Does testimony produce "skepticism" if it causes jurors to reduce the value given to
eyewitness testimony across the board when that testimony was initially overvalued, or is that
reduction an appropriate adjustment if it takes account of other factors pertaining to the conditions
under which the identification is made? This difficult question might be avoided if expert testimony
effectively helped jurors distinguish witnesses who correctly picked the perpetrator from those who
made an incorrect selection when the two sets of witnesses viewed the crime under identical
conditions. Given the ability of researchers to conduct controlled experiments where the true
perpetrator is known, it is possible to test that possibility. The results appear to be conflicting.
Compare Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 282-83 (1980) (effect of expert
testimony was to reduce mock jurors' belief that witnesses made accurate identification, and the
testimony had no statistically significant effects on the ability of the jurors either to tell accurate from
inaccurate witnesses or to take better account of conditions of observations), with Wells, Expert
Psychological Testimony: Empirical and Conceptual Analyses of Effects, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 86-88
(1986) (recounting statistically significant results of study by Wells and Wright in which expert
testimony both permitted mock jurors to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses and
to take witnessing conditions into account).
While some expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification may aid in distinguishing
between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, it is relatively difficult to imagine how much of that
testimony could aid in discrimination when all witnesses are sincere in their beliefs and viewed the
crime under identical conditions. The expert testimony may aid discrimination where, for example,
one witness is of the same race as the suspect while another must make a more difficult cross-racial
identification. See Brigham & Malpass, The Role of Experience and Contact in the Recognition of Faces of
Own- and Other-Race Persons, 12 J. Soc. ISSUES 139, 142-44 (1985) (finding consistent results that both
black and white subjects tend to recognize faces of their own race better than those of the other
race); but see Lindsay & Wells, What Do We Really Know About Cross-Race Eyewitness Identification?, in
EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 219 (S. Lloyd & B. Clifford eds. 1983) (empirical results on crossracial identification are inconsistent and research lacks effective explanatory theories). Also,
discrimination between accurate and inaccurate witnesses may be enhanced by psychological
testimony where one witness provides substantial information concerning peripheral detail in the
observation setting, which prospective jurors are likely to believe erroneously correlates positively
with an accurate identification. Wells & Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications? Using Memory for PeripheralDetail Can Be M11isleading, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 682, 686
(1981). As to other factors, such as the length of observation when it is the same for both accurate
and inaccurate witnesses, the expert should not be able to offer help in making accurate
discriminations.
As a result, the most significant impact of expert testimony is to reduce acceptance of eyewitness
testimony generally, regardless of whether the witness' identification of the defendant is in fact
accurate. This impact may be appropriate if that reduction has the effect of lowering the acceptance
of such testimony from an improperly high point to a level commensurate with the predicted
accuracy under the witnessing conditions.
However, as discussed infra, see text at notes 19-20, in this limited beneficial effect lies the rub.
The propriety of admitting expert testimony on eyewitness testimony depends on a delicate balance
between the level of current jury overvaluation of eyewitness testimony and the jury's ability to
receive expert testimony that corrects such misperception without producing overvaluing of the
expert testimony itself. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.

Page 85: Autumn 1989]

ADMISSIBILITY OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE

to determine whether an individual is telling the truth in that it does not
generally give the jury guidance on how to decide whether a particularchild is
telling the truth. Rather, the framework testimony tells jurors only that
children who make such allegations are generally highly credible. The result
of admitting framework evidence on credibility is accordingly to tilt the likely
outcome in a predictable direction to disfavor the criminal defendant.' 8
Finally, social framework testimony of the type that will be examined in
this article appears to be clearly helpful in reaching accurate decisions, but it
has characteristics that make its salutary use relatively fragile, that subject it to
relatively easy misuse, and that render blanket decisions about the propriety
of admissibility problematic. Those characteristics are related, first, to the
point discussed above about the predictable direction of impact of the
evidence and, second, to the somewhat limited utility of the evidence.
With regard to the first point, social framework evidence has a predictable
impact because of what we know about general juror reactions in the absence
of the framework evidence. In the area of eyewitness identification evidence,
for example, many researchers find that jurors have a tendency to overbelieve
the testimony of an eyewitness and to be insensitive to the conditions under
which the observations that led to the the identification occurred.19 Expert
testimony, many of these researchers argue, has a proper impact when it
makes jurors appropriately skeptical of eyewitness identification in the sense
that they evaluate it according to its likely accuracy. 2 0 The testimony thus has
a salutary effect when it corrects popular misconceptions, but has a damaging
effect if the jurors turn from overvaluing the eyewitness evidence to
overvaluing the expert's testimony questioning it.2
18. Admittedly, the framework testimony favors the prosecution, because the general evidence
gathered by social science and medical research is that, in fact, the alleged victims of child sexual
abuse generally tell the truth and that the defendants are generally guilty. This fact does not,
however, mean that every defendant is guilty. Moreover, while the framework evidence may help to
screen out some cases where it indicates that the child's particular story is not credible, such
favorable screening for the defendant appears to be relatively rare, both because most defendants
are in fact guilty and because the framework does not have strong tests to discriminate between
truthful alleged victims and those who are fabricating their testimony. Thus, a decision to admit the
social framework evidence enhances the prosecution's chances for conviction across the board, as
compared with the same case when social framework testimony is excluded.
19. E. LoF-rus, EYEwITNEss TESTiIMONY 18-19, 177 (1979) (jurors overbelieve eyewitness
testimony); Loftus & Monahan, Trial by Data: Psychological Research as Legal Evidence, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 270, 273-74 (1980) (same); Cutler, Penrod & StuveJuror Decision Iaking in Eyewitness
Identification Cases, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 41, 54 (1988) (concluding "that jurors do not possess the
knowledge and skills necessary to adequately assess the reliability of eyewitness identifications");
Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 17, at 279 (mock jurors making credibility determinations
do not adequately take into account the conditions surrounding the observation).
20. Wells, supra note 17, at 90-91 (arguing that separate from effects on verdict, expert
testimony performs a useful function if it insures that eyewitness testimony is given appropriate
weight by jurors).
21. One formulation of this argument is that framework and other similar scientific evidence,
which is ostensibly only admitted if appropriately reliable, should be admitted when it combats
popular beliefs but not when popular conceptions are in accord with scientific evidence. Cf Bonnie
& Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Pofessionalb in the Criminal Process: The Casefor Informed Speculation,
66 VA. L. REv. 427, 493-94 (1980) (expert testimony by mental health professionals should be
permitted in reconstructive inquiries when offered on behalf of the criminal defendant because, inter
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On the second issue, the framework testimony generally cannot tell jurors
much about which eyewitnesses under a given set of observation conditions
have made accurate identifications. Assume that under certain observation
conditions we can predict that 50 percent of subjects in a controlled setting
will select correctly the person who committed a mock crime. The expert can
tell the jurors that correct observations under these circumstances will likely
occur in one-half of the cases, but, as noted above, the expert can give little
guidance in determining which eyewitnesses among the group chose
correctly. The evidence is potentially subject to teaching an erroneous
lesson-that all of these identifications are to be disbelieved. 22 The
appropriate impact of the testimony therefore depends upon careful
calibration to give it only the degree of impact needed to bring juror beliefs
into accord with social reality. This limited positive effect may turn negative,
however, if the evidence is misunderstood or valued too highly by jurors.
Looking at this array of issues and problems, one can easily see that
empirical research is critically important to the correct resolution of
admissibility decisions. At the same time, it is obvious that the issues facing
researchers and courts in making these judgments are enormously difficult.
The analysis that follows examines the efforts of both lawyers and social
scientists to grapple with these problems. On the affirmative side, it is clear
that the appropriate issues have been identified and that progress is being
made by both groups in resolving them. On the other hand, the joint venture
has far to go, and, unfortunately, the mechanism available to accomplish the
alia, the prosecution has natural advantages in this area and jurors are typically skeptical of defense
explanations).
While at first glance curious, this result may be squared with well-established evidentiary
principles. First, evidence that is cumulative on a point will frequently be excluded when the same
evidence would have been received if it were the only evidence available to prove the issue. See FED.
R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note ("The availability of other means of proof may also be an
appropriate factor."). Second, when the scientific evidence is consistent with popular perceptions, its
impact is likely to be exaggerated by the jury.
The result that excludes such evidence when it accords with popular juror views also rests on an
additional premise, however. Jurors may not fully appreciate that scientific evidence often lacks
certainty. Thus, when popular beliefs and apparent scientific certainty combine, the perceived value
of the evidence will likely outstrip its true scientific reliability. In that situation, the evidence should
be excluded.
22. Expert testimony in this area may be useful at a second level in correcting jurors'
misconceptions about matters such as their own ability to evaluate whether the eyewitness has made
a mistake. One study indicates that the jurors are incapable of telling an accurate witness from an
inaccurate witness, and, in fact, will believe inaccurate witnesses at a slightly higher level, under some
circumstances, than those who were correct. Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 17, at 282.
Whether expert testimony theoretically can or will improve that ability to discriminate is open to
question, see supra note 17, but it may be helpful in educating the jury that they as jurors are unlikely
to be able to tell the difference, at least among those witnesses who are sincere in their beliefs.
Psychological research on factors affecting the accuracy of identifications can generally have an
entirely beneficial effect when it is used to structure the identification setting that isunder the control
of the prosecution. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variable and Estimator l'anables,
36J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1546, 1554-55 (1978) (contrasting "system variables," which
are within the control of investigators, with "estimator variables," which are not controllable and are
used only to discount or augment credibility).
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task-decisions by judicial officers in the adjudication of individual cases-is
ill-suited to the task.
In Part II, I set out the general evidentiary principles used by courts to
evaluate the admissibility of social framework testimony. In Part III, I
examine the conception of framework testimony developed by Walker and
Monahan and argue that a broader definition is appropriate for use in
analyzing the admissibility issues raised by this general class of evidence. In
Part IV, I analyze the case law in the area of child sexual abuse and cases
involving adult victims of rape. I also compare the courts' analyses in these
two areas using illustrative pairs of cases from two jurisdictions, and highlight
the apparent empirical assumptions underlying their decisions. Finally, in
Part V, I set out some broad categories of factors that courts find important in
deciding whether to admit evidence in these two areas. My conclusion is that
courts are more willing to admit social framework evidence in child sexual
abuse cases than in rape cases where the victim is an adult female. This
difference is not fully explained by empirical evidence that shows either a
greater need for the evidence in cases involving children or the greater
reliability of empirical research regarding framework evidence in child sexual
abuse cases. I speculate that the difference in admissibility is explained
rather by an intense feeling shared by judges about the evil of child sexual
abuse as a social phenomenon.
In another area, I note that courts generally exclude social framework
evidence when it bears directly upon issues of witness credibility. Again, I
suggest that enhanced judicial sensitivity where credibility is directly involved
is not based on a precise empirical foundation, but rather on deeply held
views about the appropriate role of the jury in our trial process. I also identify
a number of specific characteristics of the social framework evidence that play
a more narrow role in the admissibility determinations of courts regarding
such evidence. Looking at the entire area treated in this article, my overall
conclusion is that, while the results reached by the courts appear to respond
in a general fashion to appropriate empirical and doctrinal concerns, the
analysis employed is unfortunately only loosely connected to those concerns.
II
BASIC MODES OF EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS

In analyzing the admissibility of social framework evidence, courts use a
number of different modes of evidentiary analysis. While the concepts
involved frequently overlap, the categories discussed below each have an
independent focus worthy of attention.
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The Frye Test

The so-called Frye23 test requires that, before evidence of a novel scientific
principle is admissible, the scientific principle must "have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 24 The test serves two
major and several minor functions. First, it establishes a method of
determining and ensuring the reliability 2 5 of scientific evidence.2 6 Second,
while not directed by the terms of the decision to focus on this issue, 2 7 courts
generally apply the Frye test in a fashion that mandates a high threshold of
reliability for types of scientific evidence viewed as likely to overwhelm the
jury. Indeed, recently the Ninth Circuit used the tendency to overwhelm as
defining when the Frye test was required:
[E]xpert testimony based on play therapy with anatomically correct dolls must qualify
under the Frye test because the
trier of fact would tend to ascribe a high degree of
28
certainty to the technique.

The general analysis of courts here is that, where scientific evidence has a
substantial likelihood of being treated as authoritative by the jury, the
reliability of that evidence must be high to avoid the possibility of the jury's
29
overvaluing the evidence.
Supporters of the Frye test also cite two secondary advantages that
generally protect the adversary process and help to ensure its effectiveness in
23. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. Id. at 1014.
25. In the same way that most courts use the term, I shall use "reliability" throughout this paper
to convey the general sense that is conveyed by the terms "validity" and "reliability" in scientific
terminology. In scientific writing, validity refers to the accuracy of the technique in measuring what
it is intended to measure. Reliability means the consistency of the technique in measuring accurately
the phenomenon. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence. Frye v. United States, a Half
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.20 (1980). Legal use of the term reliability appears to
convey a meaning that is an amalgamation of the two scientific terms, although courts often do not
elucidate its precise meaning.
26. Id. at 1207.
Frye is cited as avoiding a situation, feared by some courts, where the trial judge would be forced
to accept the determination of any qualified witness that scientific evidence has probative value.
Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts about Trial Court Analysis of the
PrejudicialEffects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 633
(1984); see also Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientfic Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 22.
That fear seems somewhat overdrawn since, even absent the Frye test, courts are not obliged to
surrender the ultimate decision to the expert. Moreover, even under Frye, the courts must, in the
final analysis, defer substantially to expert opinion. The major difference between the two situations
is at what point, as to what issue, and to what degree the court must defer.
27. The Frye test is, by its terms, to be applied to novel scientific evidence, not to evidence likely
to be overvalued or misused. Theoretically, its application should not coincide perfectly with a
substantive concern for overvaluing. Indeed, inconsistency and indeterminacy in deciding when Frye
should apply under any clearly defined standard have been among the major weaknesses of the test.
See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1219-21 (inconsistencies and selective application of test a major
difficulty).
28. United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 481 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
This second function may more accurately be satisfied by application of Rule 403, which is
discussed below. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 609 (3d ed. 1984) (relevancy analysis, unlike
general acceptance test, is sensitive to perceived degree of prejudice flowing from the evidence).
29. See, e.g., State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 218-220, 700 P.2d 1312, 1318-19 (1984) (en banc)
(testimony concerning use of dog to identify items by "sniff" not subject to Frye test because no
danger that jury would treat "sniff" as scientifically infallible), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
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testing the scientific evidence. First, application of the Frye test helps to avoid
the time-consuming task of determining, through the receipt of evidence and
a battle of experts in numerous individual cases, the reliability of the scientific
technique or principle involved. 30 Second, it ensures "a minimal reserve of
experts who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in
a particular case," 3 ' which facilitates the adversary presentation of conflicting
views and the vigorous testing of the technique.
Frye's continued vitality in the legal analysis of social framework evidence
in many states3 2 is somewhat remarkable considering that the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not even mention it. 33 Its survival is probably explained by its
ability to produce results congenial to the courts' basic misgivings about novel
scientific evidence, including some that falls within the broad category of
social framework testimony.
With regard to the accuracy of admissibility determinations produced by
the Frye test, the two critical variables are, first, the tendency of the social

framework evidence to overwhelm the jury, and second, the reliability of the
evidence. 3 4 At a secondary level, the attractiveness of the Frye test is related
to the relative inaccessibility of social science research to the courts, both in
terms of the courts' ability to gain ready access to the research and their
capacity to understand and use 't. 35 Frye survives, to some extent, because of
courts' fears that without its easy method of determining scientific reliability
30. Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1207.
31. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. For example, recently in Gilespie, 852 F.2d at 480-81, and State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336,
342, 745 P.2d 12, 15 (1987), courts applied the Frye test to expert testimony relating to social
frameworks in the area of child sexual abuse and rape. However, Frye has not remained the test for
admissibility in other jurisdictions. During the same period, two other courts rejected Frye. See State
v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731, 736 n.9 (W. Va. 1988); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951 (Colo.
1987).
33. The uncertainty surrounding whether Frye survived the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is a tribute to the indeterminacy of rules of statutory construction. Those who claim that it
survived cite the failure of even the advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules to mention Frye,
arguing that such a major change in the existing law cannot be presumed from silence. See S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 633 (4th ed. 1986). See also
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879, 888 (1982)
("nothing in the [Federal Rules of Evidence], their history, or the advisory committee comments
discloses an express intention to repudiate the Frye test"). Those who argue that Frye was supplanted
by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules also cite the silence of the Rules and commentary as supportive.
Frye, they argue, is inconsistent with the thrust of the Federal Rules and can only continue to apply if
affirmatively sanctioned by the Rules. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234-35 (3d Cir.
1985).
34. Clearly, general acceptance is not the same as reliability, and to equate the two is essentially
to abandon the Frye test in favor of a reliability test, which fits within the relevancy analysis discussed
in Part C infra. Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1220. However, general acceptance does correlate with
high reliability, and courts often use Frye "as a label to justify their own views about the reliability of
particular forensic techniques." Id. at 1221.
35. But cf Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 588-91.
Institutional methods of proceeding and judicial thought patterns in dealing with evidence may
make it difficult for courts to use other types of technical evidence, such as statistical evidence. See
Some Lessons: The InstitutionalCompetence of Courts, in EVOLVING ROLE, supra note 9, at 72, 83. Thus, the
impetus to use Frye to protect against the intrusion of evidence that is difficult for courts to
understand and utilize is by no means limited to framework evidence.
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they will be left at the mercy of whatever expert happens to be most readily
available. To this extent, if scientific literature is accessible to the courts and
they are able independently to evaluate it, the perceived benefits of the
archaic Frye test should be reduced.
B.

Beyond the Ken of the Jury or, Alternatively, Helpfulness

Under traditional common law analysis, scientific evidence was admissible
only if the subject of the testimony was "beyond the ken" of the average juror.
Theoretically, experts were not permitted to interpret data for the jury when
the jurors themselves were capable of understanding the same information.
Under more modern evidentiary analysis, the requirement that the subject
matter must be entirely beyond the competency of the jury has been
abandoned in favor of a much less exacting requirement that the testimony be
helpful to, or assist, the jury in its evaluation of the evidence.3 6 The empirical
questions presented are, first, the relative ignorance of the jurors as to a social
condition that will be corrected by introduction of the framework evidence
and, second, the jurors' ability properly to understand and use the data
presented.

37

See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the
common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine
intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from
those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952). When opinions are excluded, it is because
they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1918
(Chadbourn rev. 1978). See also id. at § 1923, at 29 (The appropriate test is whether "on this subject
can a jury from this person receive appreciable help."); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE
702[02], at 15-16 (1988) ("[Elven when jurors are well equipped to make judgments on
the basis of their common knowledge and experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to
bring to bear on the same issue .... ").
37. Correcting juror ignorance about a social phenomenon is a somewhat unusual goal for the
legal system. A juror may be excluded from service if he has biases that "would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
his oath." Adams v. Texas, 458 U.S. 38, 45 (1980). The advocates are entitled to inquire themselves
or to have the court ask questions to determine whether such biases exist. However, with regard to
the fund of general information possessed by prospective jurors, the law appears to be uncertain.
Specific knowledge of the facts of a particular case may, of course, be grounds for disqualification,
and a case is not to be determined by such specific knowledge. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 72223 (1961). However, when it comes to the store of basic information available to jurors for their use
in evaluating evidence presented-the general body of information that helps produce what may be
called the common experience or common sense ofjurors-the law has been much less clear on what
is expected of, and permitted by, jurors. Compare Downing v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
158 Iowa 1, 138 N.W. 917 (1912) (case reversed because jurors instructed that they could consider
their own observations and experience in determining whether to accept expert testimony
concerning cause of death of livestock), with Solberg v. Robbins Lumber Co., 147 Wis. 259, 133 N.W.
28 (1911) (jurors properly instructed that they could use their personal knowledge). See generally
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 329, at 923-24.
Social framework evidence often seeks to correct either specific factual or logical
misunderstandings that prospective jurors hold in common with others in society that may interfere
with their ability to evaluate evidence correctly. This effort to fine tune juror common knowledge by
the introduction of expert testimony as opposed to assuming that adequate experience exists in the
jury as a whole to evaluate adequately the evidence in the case appears new to the law and raises a set
of knotty theoretical and practical problems. See, for example, the debate between Professors Gold
and Tanford over the existence and extent of the dangers involved in the expanded use of
36.
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If this helpfulness standard were applied literally and the court considered
only the benefits possible through the testimony, the expert's testimony
concerning a relevant social condition would be found helpful unless the jury
were as knowledgeable as the expert or as able as the expert to interpret
technical evidence. However, in applying the helpfulness requirement, courts
have looked not only at the potential benefits of the testimony. Instead, they
have both explicitly and implicitly weighed the potential aid the jury would
receive from the expert's testimony against the possibility that such testimony
would have a distorting influence on the trial process in terms of consumption
of time, injection of distracting side issues (such as expert competence), and,
particularly, creation of the potential for overvaluation of the expert's
38
testimony.
The empirical issue thus becomes one of the value of the expert in
dispelling ignorance or helping to evaluate evidence, which is a function of
the quality of the expert's data and analysis, the degree of ignorance on the
part of the jury of the social phenomenon, and the difficulty of the evaluative
task. These factors are weighed against the distorting influence that may be
produced by expert testimony on the issue.
The helpfulness test as applied to expert testimony that a witness is
testifying truthfully or falsely deserves special attention. Courts often
purport to apply a pure helpfulness standard in this area without any reliance
upon concepts such as overvaluation. In rejecting the testimony, the
argument typically accepted is that the expert has no special ability beyond

psychologists by lawyers in selecting and influencing jurors. Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the
Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C.L. REV. 481 (1987); Tanford &
Tanford, Better Trials through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REV. 741
(1988).
38. See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382-86, 728 P.2d 248, 252-56 (1986) (testimony of expert,
inter alia, that child's behavior consistent with sexual abuse having occurred inadmissible under
Arizona Rule 702 as not assisting jury because it conveyed expert's belief in credibility of victim);
People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951-52 (Colo. 1987) (given fact that expert opinion was limited
with regard to reactions of rape victims generally and was not used to establish that crime was
committed, testimony properly received under Colorado Rule 702); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269,
272-75 (Del. Sup. 1987) (initial question under Delaware Rule 702 is whether expert testimony on
intrafamily child sexual abuse will assist jury in understanding evidence, but to be admissible such
evidence must be limited to general behavioral factors and may not suggest quantification of veracity
determination as it carries too much potential for credibility enhancement); State v. Hester, 114
Idaho 688, 695-96, 760 P.2d 27, 34-35 (1988) (testimony identifying attacker invades jury's function
rather than assisting it and is inadmissible under Idaho Rule 702); State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731,
736-37 (W. Va. 1988) (under West Virginia Rule 702, testimony concerning symptoms of rape
trauma syndrome admissible, but opinion that the victim was raped inadmissible because it
encroaches too powerfully upon jury's role in determining credibility; confusing or misleading
testimony properly excluded under Rule 702).
Whether the issues of consumption of time, confusion of the issues, and overvaluation of expert
testimony are properly considered as a part of the helpfulness inquiry or should be confined to a
relevancy analysis is not clear. Courts clearly do amalgamate the two issues, and they weigh these
factors in applying the helpfulness test, which otherwise would be almost automatically met,
assuming the expert had any special knowledge, training, or experience, beyond that of the jurors,
relevant to an issue in the case.
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that of lay people to determine whether a witness is lying.3 9 That argument
alone, however, does not entirely explain the frequency with which courts
exclude the testimony. Rather, the importance of the credibility issue affected
by the evidence comes into play, 40 as well as a concern for possible
overvaluation of the expert's testimony. Finally, courts appear to be deeply
concerned that expert opinions on credibility will have an undesirable effect
upon the role of the jury in assessing authoritatively the credibility of
witnesses and will thereby subvert the important values, beyond those of
accurate factfinding, 41 that a jury verdict serves.
In addition to the modern helpfulness interpretation of the "beyond the
ken" concept, some courts employ several additional, somewhat related, tests,
particularly in the area of credibility. First, they rule that expert testimony
should not be admissible when "the state of the pertinent art or scientific
knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an
expert." 4 2 This test better explains the exclusion of some expert testimony
on credibility than a pure helpfulness test, since the courts appear to be saying
that no one can give a reasonably reliable opinion in this area, rather than that
an expert can make no better assessment than a layman.
Second, the testimony of the expert is occasionally excluded under the
argument that an expert opinion that a sexual assault on a child occurred, for
example, improperly "convert[s] hearsay declarations into admissible
opinions." 4 3 As a general matter, modern evidentiary analysis finds nothing
44
improper in an expert relying on inadmissible hearsay to form an opinion.
This objection accordingly should be viewed as largely a restatement in
different terms of the valid objection given immediately above-hearsay may
not be relied upon to form an opinion where the expert does not have
sufficient expertise to reach a reasonable opinion. In effect, the courts are
saying here that experts are not sufficiently more adept at evaluating the
credibility of witnesses than jurors when their opinions are based on
39. See, e.g., United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986) ("No reliable test for
truthfulness exists and [the expert] was not qualified to judge the truthfulness of that part of [the
witness'] story.").
40. Fed. R. Evid. 704 eliminated any explicit restriction on testimony concerning an "ultimate
issue," except in the limited context of an insanity defense to a criminal charge. It did not eliminate,
however, the greater sensitivity of the courts to opinions that affect important issues in the cases. Cf
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 12, at 30 (courts tend to be more liberal in allowing
opinions where facts are collateral to important issues but tend to require concrete details as to more
crucial matters).
41. For further discussion of these values, see infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
42. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 13, at 34. See also Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d
827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977) (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 31 (2d
ed. 1972)); McCord, supra note 14, at 86 ("The most used alternative to the Frye test is the Dyas
test.").

43. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 695, 760 P.2d 27, 34 (1988). Some courts alternatively view
such an opinion as constituting testimony on the credibility of the witness, focusing on the fact that
the major basis of the opinion is the witness' statement to the expert. See McCord, supra note 14, at
42 n.82.
44. See, e.g., State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98-99, 517 A.2d 741, 745-46 (1985).
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statements by witnesses in the case. The result is that opinions depending
45
critically upon judgments of witness credibility may be excluded.
Finally, expert testimony may not be admitted when the testimony creates
the danger that expert testimony will mislead the jury concerning legal
issues. 46 In prosecutions for rape, some courts exclude expert testimony that
the victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome on the basis that such
testimony improperly employs a legal conclusion that may be misleading or
may be misunderstood. Specifically, consent in rape cases is defined in many
states from the point of view of the defendant's reasonable, good faith
perception. Since the incidence of rape trauma syndrome should relate to
the victim's perception of whether she in fact consented and not the
defendant's view, if they differ, the conclusion reached by the expert
concerning what has been labeled as "rape trauma" may connote not only a
legal determination but also a determination under an erroneous standard.
The expert's conclusion appears to concern the legal issue to be decided by
47
the jurors, but, in fact, the term "rape" is defined differently by the expert.
The existence of this potential source of misunderstanding has led some
courts and commentators to utilize terminology that avoids the appearance of
48
reaching a legal conclusion.
C.

Relevancy

Modern evidence law defines relevancy according to two factors. First, the
fact to which the evidence arguably relates must be of consequence to the
outcome of the case and must make that consequential fact more or less likely
45. But cf.Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statementsfor the Purpose of Medical Diagnosisor Treatment,
67 N.C.L. REV. 257, 261-64 (1989) (noting that one possible trustworthiness rationale for admission
of hearsay statements to medical experts consulted only for diagnosis and not for treatment is that
such experts have special expertise in evaluating the accuracy of the data given them because of their
training and experience).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note: "The abolition of the ultimate issue rule
does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be
helpful to the trier of fact . . . These provisions . .. stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria."
47. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 250 n.12, 681 P.2d 291, 300 n.12, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459
n.12 (1984).
Courts raise a related, but conceptually distinct, objection that the use of the terminology "rape
trauma syndrome" may mislead the jury in the sense of being overvalued because they may believe
that "such a classification reflects a scientific judgment that the witness was, in fact, raped." Id. at
251 n.14, 681 P.2d 301 n.14, 203 Cal. Rptr. 460 n.14. See also Allewalt, 308 Md. at 102-03, 517 A.2d
at 751 (unfair prejudice largely reduced when expert does not use "rape trauma" terminology
because it does not equate the syndrome exclusively with rape); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240
(Mo. 1984) (en banc) (testimony concerning "rape trauma" syndrome appears to give scientific
certainty to the fact that the trauma causing witness' condition was a rape). Expert testimony
regarding whether a rape occurred does not, however, run afoul of another fundamental limitation
encountered when expert testimony is offered on an insanity defense. Expert testimony on the
ultimate issue of criminal responsibility may be seen as involving normative as well as empirical
judgments, the former involving moral determinations that are beyond clinical expertise. See Bonnie
& Slobogin, supra note 21, at 456.
48. Massaro, supra note 3, at 450-52 (suggesting the use of "post-traumatic stress disorder"
instead of rape trauma syndrome).
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than it would be in the absence of the testimony. 4 9 Second, the prejudice,
confusion, delay, and distortion resulting from the admission of relevant
evidence must not substantially outweigh its probative value. 50 In most
situations, the first relevancy factor is easily established whereas prejudice
concerns are more complicated and difficult to resolve.
Nevertheless, even when ostensibly dealing only with the first set of
questions, some courts have excluded social framework evidence under the
theory that it has no relevancy to the case. They object to the framework
testimony because it is derived from general studies concerning a broad
group and does not concern the particular individual or the specific conduct
51
of that individual in the case.

Whether a relevancy objection in the narrow sense posed by the first set of
questions is valid depends upon two issues. First, is it possible to use
probabilistic evidence generally or group behavior specifically to guide a
factfinder in determining whether an event happened in the past, as opposed
to using such evidence to predict what will happen in the future? In theory,
there should be no significant difference in the use of such data to perform the
two tasks. 52 Second, will knowledge about group performance shed light on
the likelihood of the behavior at issue in the case on trial? 53 The answer here
depends largely upon the accuracy of the general grouping of people who
display relevant behavior or characteristics and the correspondence between
the relevant participant in the case and that group. While some minimal level
of scientific validity and reliability of the categorization must be met, and
jurors, either alone or with expert assistance, must be able at some minimal
level to determine whether the individual possesses the relevant
characteristic, as a matter of relevancy as described in Federal Rule of
Evidence 401, the issue is easily resolved.
Assuming the evidence satisfies the initial relevancy inquiry, one then
encounters the more difficult issue of what "prejudice" may flow from
admission of the evidence. This is not "prejudice" in the strict sense of
exciting an emotional reaction as it is defined in the Federal Rules.

54

Scientific evidence generally, or social framework testimony in particular,
49. These issues are raised by Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
50. The Federal Rules of Evidence treat these questions under Rule 403.
51. The reasoning in State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982), is suggestive of this
approach: "The jury must not decide this case on the basis of how most people react to rape ... [but
rather] the jury must decided what happened in this case .... "
52. "[Plropositions about past facts . . . [can be regarded as] 'predictions,' on existing
information, as to what the 'truth' will turn out to be when and if more knowledge is available." Ball,
The Mfoment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 815 (1961)
(footnote omitted). See also Tribe, supra note 5, at 1345-46; Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 57475.
53. The theory supporting admissibility is that one may generalize from the behavior of a
relevant group to the likely behavior of an individual member of that group. The validity of the
inference depends critically upon the fact that the group is similar to the individual with regard to
some specific feature that relates positively to the behavior or condition at issue.
54. " 'Unfair prejudice' within this context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory
committee's note.
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rarely excites strong emotional reactions. 5 5 Rather, the chief concern is with

juror overvaluation of the testimony of an expert resulting chiefly from the
aura of science associated with that testimony. 5 6 Whether valuation is
excessive is, of course, a relative determination and depends upon the value

of the inference drawn as compared with its impact on the jury. It obviously
involves both an examination of the reliability of the social framework
testimony, the quality of the linkage between that framework and a relevant
individual in the case, and the potential for jurors to give the testimony
57
inappropriate weight.
The analysis of relative valuation often is quite difficult both in terms of
the legal and the empirical issues and raises questions related to the precise
form in which the evidence will be presented. An important concern here is
whether particularized testimony will be offered about an individual in the
case based on clinical examination by an expert or whether only social
framework evidence will be offered without the expert directly linking the
framework to the individual. 58 The potential for the evidence to be
overvalued is likely to be less when the expert testifies only to general results
than when he or she explains concretely the application of that data to the
55. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 575-76.
56. Secondary concerns pertain to the consumption of time and confusion of issues when
experts battle, when contests are waged over the credentials of experts, and when the quality of the
science involved is subject to conflicting claims.
57. Adding to the difficulty of both gauging and controlling the impact of social framework
evidence on the jury is the intrinsic difficulty of educating lay jurors on some aspects of the empirical
basis and significance of such evidence. I offer here no empirical data but rather the anecdotal
experience of some instructors who find it very, very difficult to explain effectively to college and law
student audiences how to interpret data that involve the use of base rates. Whether this difficulty
leads to excessive valuation or complete rejection of the evidence is unclear and, I suspect,
dependent upon factors that vary almost independently of the reliability of the data, such as
demeanor of the expert giving the explanation.
58. Courts differ as to whether it matters for the purpose of admissibility that the expert
provides a direct opinion concerning the victim or gives instead only social framework testimony. As
to some issues, the form of the testimony is considered important by the courts. For example, some
courts permit admission of the expert's opinion that a child was the victim of a sexual assault. State
v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 692-93, 760 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1988); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 118,
734 P.2d 705, 708, (1987); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655-56 (1988).
Other courts will not allow testimony that an assault occurred but will permit general testimony
concerning the characteristics of children who have been sexually assaulted from which the jury max'
infer that the victim was assaulted. State v. Moran, 1.51 Ariz. 378, 384-86, 728 P.2d 248, 254-56
(1986); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49-50 (Cal. Ct. App.
5th Dist. 1985).
As to other issues, such as testimony concerning the credibility of the witness, this distinction is
critical, and only general social framework evidence as opposed to a direct opinion about the witness
stands much chance of being received. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 474-75, 720 P.2d 73,
75-76 (1986) (en banc) (direct testimony on credibility not permitted, and even testimony giving
statistics concerning children's veracity improper, but general patterns of child behavior relevant to
credibility without a statistical base admissible); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274-75 (Del. Sup.
1987) (same); State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 11, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533, disc. rev. denied. 320 N.C. 174,
358 S.E.2d 64 (1987) (expert cannot give direct testimony that child witness is believable but may
give testimony concerning general credibility of children). See also State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343,
346 (Me. 1989) (expert testimony on child witness' credibility properly excluded because lacking in
"scientifically accepted basis").
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behavior of a witness in the case. 5 9 Other variations in the form of the
testimony should also enhance this likelihood of overvaluation, such as the
use of explicitly statistical proof, and the presence of mechanically produced
60
displays with an imposing appearance.
Aside from explicit concerns about the impact of the form of the testimony
on juror overreaction to framework evidence, relevancy analysis must be
concerned with how the individual and the social group are shown to
correspond as to some relevant feature. As noted above, the probative value
of the social framework testimony rests upon the similarity with regard to
some important characteristic between a participant in the case and the
members of a social group. In some cases, where the correspondence
between the group and the individual is obvious on a feature that the expert
will testify is critical, this aspect of the relevancy issue is easily resolved.
Relevancy exists if the principle involved itself is valid and the technique used
is an effective method for producing the result indicated under the proper
operation of that principle. In other situations, where the very existence of
the correspondence between critical features is subject to doubt, is not
determinable directly by the jury, or corresponds with the disputed issue in
61
the case, the issue is far more complicated.
59. Professors Vidmar and Schuller discuss studies that indicate that the manner of presentation
of social framework evidence has critical impact upon its effect on thejury. Vidmar & Schuller, Juries
and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 133.
Professor Schuller's own study indicates that only when the testimony concerning the description of
the battered woman syndrome was connected to the case through a specific diagnosis did the
evidence have substantial impact upon mock jurors' decisions. Id. at 152-53. Professors Brekke and
Borgida found similarly that mock jurors made the most use of expert testimony concerning rape
when it was linked to the case through a specific hypothetical example and was presented early in the
case. Brekke & Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 372, 376-77 (1988).
Presumably greater effectiveness of the expert testimony gives rise to a correspondingly greater
likelihood of overvaluation.
60. See Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 272-87 (1981) (suggesting categories of
scientific evidence according to certain general characteristics relating to the weight jurors may
ascribe to them). See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989), and State v. Goon
Kyu) Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547-49 (Minn. 1987), which exclude population frequency statistics from
expert testimony interpreting the results of blood tests (Kim) and DNA typing (Schwartz) as methods
of identification because of the potential of such evidence to have an exaggerated impact on the jury.
61. Let us use rape trauma syndrome as an example. First, in the easiest case, the parties do not
disagree on the issue of whether the victim was raped. The defendant may concede that the victim
was indeed raped but contests identity. The victim's membership in a group of victims is thus
established by agreement. However, another critical element of relevancy analysis may be eliminated
as an indirect result of the stipulation. The social framework evidence may have nothing to say that
makes a fact of consequence more or less likely. The rape trauma syndrome would generally tell us
nothing about the specific identity of the attacker, which is the only issue contested by the defendant.
What it tells us about consent goes to an issue that is not contested. As a result, while the evidence is
technically not irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, confusion will outweigh probativity
under Rule 403, and the evidence should be excluded. See FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's
note.
Second, consent may be contested and the expert may testify from his or her clinical examination
and from knowledge of social framework information that the complaining witness was the victim of a
rape or exhibits certain features consistent with the general behavior of the group of women who
have been raped. Given that testimony, the social framework testimony tells us, in the first situation,
that it is more likely that the complaining witness was the victim of a rape and, in the second
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Three questions are implicated here: How easily is the correspondence
determined? How central is the determination of that correspondence to the
outcome of the case? How likely is it that the jury will presume the
defendant's guilt from the existence of a scientifically defined social grouping
with apparently relevant characteristics and some plausible correspondence
62
between the witness' characteristics and those of the group?
In summary, since the prejudice of chief concern in this area is the
potential overvaluation of expert scientific evidence by the jurors, the most
important issue for legal relevancy is the proper valuation of the evidence by
the jury. The analysis is not one of absolute values but one of comparative
weight. 63 The key questions are: Precisely how reliable is the scientific result
being applied? (This question includes not only the general research, but also
the fit between the social framework and a relevant individual. 6 4 ) How
impressive will the jury find this evidence? The empirical issues raised here
become very specific and complicated. The form of the testimony, a subject
on which empirical research is only beginning, may be the most critical
instance, that the fact that the complaining witness displayed certain specific behavior makes it more
likely that she was raped. The major concern here is that in identifying the complaining witness
directly or inferentially as a member of the group of rape victims, the expert is expressing an opinion
central to the ultimate outcome of the case. Drawing the connection between the classification and
the individual, which is essential to the relevancy of the social framework information, may produce
prejudice because the drawing of that connection is the central issue in the case. See People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 250 n.14, 681 P.2d 291, 301 n.14, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 n.14 (1984) (rape
trauma syndrome may erroneously convey to jury that "such a classification reflects a scientific
judgment that the witness was, in fact, raped"); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) (same).
Third, consent may be contested but, instead of expressing a direct or indirect opinion on the
complaining witness' membership in the group of rape victims, the expert may leave that
determination to the jury. The expert in this situation would give a general description of the
characteristics of a group, and the jury may be asked to draw from the evidence the relevant facts and
determine whether the witness has those characteristics. If the jury can adequately draw an
appropriate conclusion as to the individual's membership in the group, fewer dangers exist from use
of the social framework testimony.
Since this third form of evidence presents the fewest problems in terms of concerns under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, it appears clearly to be the preferable form. And, indeed, the form of
the testimony is often critical for admissibility. See supra note 58. Unfortunately, such evidence, see
supra note 59, is also likely to be less effective. Accordingly, unless this form of the testimony is
required by prejudice concerns, a party should not be limited to it.
62. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 1366 (arguing that when statistical data are introduced on the issue
of identity, jurors have a tendency to lose sight of non-quantified issues such as intent--"the hard
variables tend to swamp the soft").
63. For an effort to apply a system that compares the reliability of the evidence to the jury's
tendency to mis-evaluate it in relation to the hearsay rule, see Note, The Theoretical Foundationsof the
Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1786 (1980).
64. Another issue that relates to the value of the evidence is the extent ofjuror misinformation
concerning the relevant social phenomenon that could be corrected by the framework testimony.
This issue relates not to the tendency of the evidence to prove a fact but to the degree that the fact
needs to be proved, which turns on juror knowledge that predates presentation of evidence in the
particular case.
While appearing very similar to the concerns discussed in this section under relevancy, the degree
of juror misconception relates more directly to the analysis of the helpfulness of the expert's
testimony, discussed in the preceding section. As noted there, courts tend to amalgamate concerns
relating to helpfulness and relevancy, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, and this is as it
should be, since the issues, while often distinct in other areas, overlap considerably when
determining the admissibility of social framework testimony.
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determinant. As noted above, an important issue is whether the testimony is
specific to the witness and is based on clinical examination or is presented as
general data concerning group characteristics, which the jury is asked to apply
to the individual. Also, forms of testimony may vary with regard to how
scientific they appear to be; some may have a particularly powerful impact
upon a jury because they appear to carry a message of infallibility. Whether
the characteristics of testimony that affect the likelihood of overvaluation can
be generalized from one area and type of social framework evidence to
65
another remains unclear.

D.

Character Evidence

Dean McCormick defined character as "a generalized description of a
person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general trait such as
honesty, temperance or peacefulness." 66 Historically, the law of evidence has
strictly controlled the admission of character evidence and has required that it
be proved in certain specified and rather stylized forms.
Evidence of character is not excluded because it is irrelevant in the sense
that it lacks any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence more
or less likely. 6 7 Rather, it is excluded in most situations because its probativity
is considered as relatively slight and its potential for prejudice relatively
68
great.
The traditional treatment of character evidence may have broad
importance for the admissibility of social framework evidence. One may
argue that social framework evidence generally resembles character evidence
and should be admissible according to rules similar to those governing
character evidence. The argument is that just as character may indicate a
propensity for an individual to act in a certain way, social framework evidence
69
about a relevant group provides guidance in predicting individual conduct.
If this analogy is accepted, a whole set of rules concerning admissibility of
social framework testimony could follow. Such rules could include: the
exclusion of almost all such evidence from civil cases except that pertaining to
credibility; the restriction that evidence enhancing credibility could only be
admitted after certain types of attacks on the witness' credibility; and the
limitation that only a criminal defense could initiate the introduction of
65. Whether social scientists will be able to reach conclusions that can be easily generalized
remains unclear. Unfortunately, it appears that at this point judicial analysis is poorly suited for
generalization from one decision about admissibility in one field of social framework testimony to
those in another. See Massaro, supra note 3, at 464 (arguing that because judicial opinions describe so
poorly the differences between expert testimony that produced the determination on admissibility,
reasoning from earlier opinions by analogy and comparison will be difficult); McCord, supra note 14,
at 92 (admissibility decisions will require "hard work" by the courts, with careful analysis of
particular facts of cases, societal attitudes, and psychological research literature).
66. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 195, at 574.
67. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
68. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 186, at 549.
69. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 581.
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character evidence outside the credibility area pertaining to the defendant's
70
or victim's conduct.
E.

Social Framework Evidence Relating to Credibility

One of the most sensitive areas in the law of evidence is the receipt of
expert testimony concerning credibility. While the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not bar expert testimony on the "ultimate issue" in the case, 7 1 the
preeminence of the jury in the determination of credibility remains
unquestioned. The meaning of the often-repeated phrase that the credibility
of the witness is within the "exclusive province" of the jury 72 is the key
question when determining the admissibility of expert testimony relating
directly or indirectly to credibility. While this catch phrase provides
unfortunately little concrete guidance in resolving the admissibility issue,
particular judicial sensitivity in this area is a reality that must be confronted. 73
70.

See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608.

For a general discussion of these issues, see M. GRAHAM,

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§§ 404.1-404.5, 405.1-405.2, 608.1-608.5 (2d ed. 1986).
71. "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EvID.
704.
72. State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987) (en banc). See also, e.g., Head
v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. 1988). In Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind. 1989),
the Indiana Supreme Court attempted ineptly to explain the result in Head, initially stated in terms of
invading the province of the jury, on the basis that such testimony was inadmissible because it was
"an area well within ajuror's common knowledge and experience." As discussed below, see infra note
81 and accompanying text, while the results are consistent, explanations like that in Henson are both
unsatisfying and theoretically unsustainable.
73. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has taken a broad position against receiving
framework testimony in either child sexual abuse or adult rape cases. In almost any form, the court
views framework testimony as encroaching upon the jury's exclusive role in determining witness
credibility.
In Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986), the court rejected expert
testimony that young children as a group do not fabricate stories about sexual abuse. Id. at 441-44,
517 A.2d at 921-22. It found such testimony to encroach upon the jury's exclusive province in
determining credibility matters and to invite the jury to " 'abdicate its responsibility to ascertain the
facts relying upon the questionable premise that the expert is in a better position to make such a
judgment.' " Id. at 443-44, 517 A.2d at 922 (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 229,
352 A.2d 30, 32 (1976)).
The court reaffirmed and amplified its position two years later in Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa.
77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988). There the expert testified at trial that children who have been involved in
sexual experiences typically do not fantasize about them. The testimony given by the expert was free
of many of the problems that lead courts in other states to exclude such testimony. See infra notes
127-29 and accompanying text. The expert had not examined the alleged victim and accordingly
gave no clinical testimony. Also, his testimony omitted any reference to a statistical basis for his
general conclusion. Nevertheless, the Davis court concluded that the testimony was improperly
received because it violated the rule set out in Seese that expert testimony impermissibly intruded
upon the province of the jury when it amounted to an expert "assessment of the truthfulness of the
class of people of which the particular witness is a member." Davis, 518 Pa. at 82, 541 A.2d at 317.
The court made it clear that expert testimony would violate its rule even if the expert made no
express comment on the credibility of a witness. It left open, however, the possibility that some
testimony by an expert on the general dynamics of child abuse would be proper.
In Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 377 Pa. Super. 246, 546 A.2d 1249 (1988), appeal denied, 557 A.2d
721 (1989), the intermediate court of appeals in Pennsylvania used the rationale of Seese and Davis to
hold inadmissible testimony by an expert that the child's behavior and that of child sexual abuse
victims were closely allied. Id. at 254-55, 546 A.2d at 1253. Such testimony does not constitute a
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Indeed, it is because social framework evidence often indirectly (and
occasionally directly) involves expert testimony on credibility that it has often
been held inadmissible.
Under orthodox common law formulations, the courts faced no serious
issue involving the admissibility of expert opinion as to character; it was
excluded. The reason was that expert testimony concerning character takes
the form of an opinion, and under the strict common law view, character
could only be proved by reputation and not by opinion testimony. Expert
testimony was received in a related area, however. When an abnormality of
the witness affected his or her capacity to perceive or to remember, for
instance, expert testimony was generally receivable.7 4 Under Rule 405(a) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, character testimony may now be offered in the
form of opinion testimony, thus removing what had been an indirect but
75
effective bar to expert testimony on character.

direct opinion of an expert concerning credibility or even testimony concerning the credibility of a
group. Rather, it concerns the correspondence between the behavior of the child and of the
framework group going to whether a sexual assault occurred. Yet, despite the apparently lessened
threat to the jury's role in assessing credibility that this form of expert testimony posed, it was
excluded. See also Commonwealth v. Higby, 384 Pa. Super. 619, 624, 559 A.2d 939, 941 (1989)
(similar testimony properly excluded because it "served only to bolster the credibility of the alleged
victim"); Commonwealth v. Emge, 381 Pa. Super. 139, 553 A.2d 74 (1988) (testimony that child's
behavior was consistent with those of sexually molested children excluded, the court concluding that
"behavior testimony equally invades the exclusive province of the fact finder") (emphasis in original).
For a further treatment of the impact of the form of the testimony upon admissibility, see infra notes
110-13 and accompanying text.
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355 (1988), the state supreme
court excluded expert testimony concerning the rape trauma syndrome in a case involving the rape
of an adult. The expert first described the symptomatology of the syndrome and the expert's
examination of the victim. The expert then rendered an opinion that the victim was suffering from
rape trauma syndrome and that the syndrome contributed to the victim's failure to identify the
defendant two weeks after the crime. Id. at 293, 547 A.2d at 356-57. The court again found the
testimony an intrusion upon the jury's exclusive function in determining credibility and excluded it.
Id. at 297, 542 A.2d at 358-59.
These cases reject social framework testimony broadly, ignoring distinctions that courts in other
states have found important to admissibility. They reject testimony in both child sexual abuse and
adult rape cases. They reject testimony going both to credibility and to whether the sexual abuse
occurs and exclude it regardless of the fact that no clinical testimony is given concerning the victim,
no statistical basis of the framework testimony is utilized, and no explicit opinion concerning
credibility is rendered. The great sensitivity shown by some courts to intrusion on jury
determination of credibility appears to be clearly at work in these results.
74. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1986) (noting that expert testimony
concerning organic or mental disorders is admissible to attack the witness' credibility).
75. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512,
516-17 (3d Cir. 1981) (expert testimony concerning defendant's susceptibility to entrapment
properly admissible under rules governing proof of character), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984);
United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1977) (opinion of psychologist that
defendant was more likely to hurt himself rather than others improperly excluded in prosecution for
assault on federal officer).
Indeed, the advisory committee gave as an example the opinion of a psychiatrist as to the trait of
honesty. The committee recognized that no effective dividing line exists between mental capacity,
which had been traditionally receivable through opinion testimony, and character evidence, which
had been excluded. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
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However, the expansion of character evidence to include expert opinions
has been received with great caution by courts. 76 The traditional form for
receiving character evidence concerning credibility may also have an impact
on the receipt of direct testimony by an expert concerning the believability of
the witness. An opinion that the witness has good character for truthfulness
would appear to be admissible under the Rules, but testimony that in the
expert's opinion the witness told the truth on a particular occasion, such as in
a conversation with the expert about the incident at issue in the trial, may not
77
be.
Frequently, the results reached by the courts in this area, which generally
exclude expert testimony relating to credibility, may be explained by
straightforward application of the concepts of helpfulness and relevancy,
developed above. In many situations where statements by experts have been
value related to his or her
excluded, the expert had nothing of substantial
78

expertise to offer on the issue of credibility.

Where the expert lacks such

special expertise, excluding the testimony is easily understood, but in other
situations, the outcomes are not so simple to explain.
For example, some symptoms of rape trauma syndrome may be difficult to
fake; others are counterintuitive and would require substantial research and
likely willful deception to fabricate. 79 Nevertheless, one court flatly rejected
testimony concerning the witness' credibility where the expert testified to the
76. For further discussion see infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
The drafters of the revised rules of evidence in North Carolina fashioned a rule that continues
traditional practice. They added to Federal Rule 405(a) the following sentence: "Expert testimony
on character or a trait of character is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of character." N.C. R.
EvID. 405(a).
77. Compare United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986), with State v. Kim, 64 Haw.
598, 609 n.14, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n.14 (1982). The objection is that the expert does not state an
opinion on the character of the witnesses but rather gives an opinion concerning his or her
truthfulness on a particular occasion, which is not a general trait of character.
78. See, e.g., State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 597-99, 350 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1986) (pediatrician
improperly permitted to testify that she formed an opinion during the course of the examination that
the child victim was believable). In many of the reported cases, such as Aguallo, one wonders why
experts, who are often cautious in the exercise of their professional judgment, would be willing to
venture opinions in areas fraught with so much uncertainty.
79. Massaro, supra note 3, at 449-50. See also State v.Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 96-97, 517 A.2d 74 1,
744-45 (1986) (psychiatrist testified in response to defense questioning that he was not relying
exclusively upon belief in witness' story, citing the correspondence between witness' story and
textbook symptoms).
In this process the expert may be applying a special ability in comparing statements of the witness
with observed behavior and symptoms. The expert thus,may possess both a special basis and special
skill or experience in making an assessment of credibility measurably superior to lay factfinders. Cf
FED. R. EviD. 803(4) (admits hearsay statements made to medical expert when relied upon by expert
to reach opinion even where declarant's self-interest in treatment not involved, apparently under
theory that expert evaluates trustworthiness of statement in determining whether to rely on it);
Mosteller, supra note 45.
When this author was practicing criminal law, I was told by psychiatrists of claims of
hallucinations frequently made by incarcerated defendants who were trying to fabricate an insanity
defense. The problem from the point of view of the prisoners was that, being unschooled in the
scientific literature, they would pick particularly lurid versions which they apparently believed would
instantly demonstrate their insanity. However, among those who were demonstrably ill and for
whom fabrication was not suspected, hallucinations having the particular content described by the
defendants were never observed. The effort at fabrication accordingly ended quickly in failure.
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difficulty of fabricating testimony8 0 and another refused to exclude such
testimony only because it had been provoked by defense cross-examination
and had not been the subject of proper objection. 8 1 In addition to rejecting
claimed specific expertise in evaluating credibility, courts are all but
unanimous that experts may not render an explicit judgment concerning the
82
credibility of a witness.
When examining the courts' treatment of social framework testimony
directly and indirectly affecting witness credibility, one has the clear sense that
the courts are enforcing values somewhat distinct from the traditional
concerns of accurate factfinding and a precise balancing of probativity and
prejudice. Indeed, it appears undeniable that other values are influencing the
courts in their insistence that great care be exercised in the admission of
evidence in this area.
In his influential article, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process,83 Professor Tribe describes the typical lawsuit as only partly an
objective search for historical truth. He argues that it is also in an important
way a ritual of conflict settlement that is partially inconsistent with a relentless
search for the truth.8 4 Professor Nesson more recently has made related
arguments that attempt to explain a number of legal rules as designed to
produce verdicts that are acceptable, in the sense of permitting the public to
defer to the judgment of the legal factfinders about a past event. Ready

80. State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 237, 240-41 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (expert testified that
witness "would not be capable of feigning the symptoms" observed; opinion as to witness' credibility
held improper).
81. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986).
82. See e.g., Tingle v. State, 536 So. 2d 202, 205 (Fla. 1988); Head v. State, 519 N.E.2d 151, 153
(Ind. 1988); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 237, 240-41 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Aguallo, 318
N.C. 590, 599, 350 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1986); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391-93 (Utah 1989). The
one exception is State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 609 n.14, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n.14 (1982). Professor
Berger argues that Kim is in accord with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that, in spite
of the rather consistent exclusion of expert testimony directly supporting credibility, its reception
follows proper modern evidentiary analysis. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Lau Approach
to an Expert's Opinion about a Witness's Credibility Still Does not Work, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 559, 620-21
(1989). She argues that courts should not categorically exclude all expert testimony of this type.
Instead, two limitations should be applied. First, such expert testimony may be admitted only after
the witness' credibility is attacked. Id. at 612-13. Second, before receiving such testimony, the court
must conclude that its probative value in terms of the reliability of the evidence is sufficiently high to
counterbalance its potential to be unduly persuasive and uncritically accepted by the jury. Id. at 60407, 615. See also State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989), which comes very close to
embracing Kim's position, although the court in Bachman rested admissibility in part on the basis that
the experts did not "testifly] that the girls were absolutely telling the truth." Id. at 275.
In contrast to the issue of whether an expert may give a direct opinion on the credibility of a
witness, courts in different jurisdictions take varying positions on many issues involving admission of
social framework testimony in child sexual abuse and rape prosecutions. The extent of agreement in
this area appears unique.
83. Tribe, supra note 5.
84. Id.at 1376-77. The argument that empirical data disrupt other goals of the adversarial
process, laden as it is with "necessary" ambiguities, is once again powerfully made in Saks, Enhancing
and RestrainingAccuracy in Adjudication, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 243.
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deference by the public is important, he argues, since the factual judgments
85
reached provide a basis for imposing significant legal sanctions.
The sensitivity of the credibility determination by the lay jury is clearly
near the core of this ritual process and among the most sensitive of all its
aspects. I suspect that the caution of the courts in admitting such evidence
relates in some important ways to their recognition of these additional values.
Indeed, it is difficult to explain some sets of results without reference outside
a strict truth-seeking model of trials. 86
III
THE NARROW VIEW OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK TESTIMONY OF
PROFESSORS WALKER AND MONAHAN

Walker and Monahan, in their article Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law,8 7 argue very persuasively that social framework testimony
should be available to assist the jury in deciding cases. However, theirs is a
relatively limited view of this type of evidence that places the conduct or
condition of a relevant individual in the context of a larger social group.
Their definition is certainly more limited than the view taken by litigants and
courts. Courts frequently admit evidence that plays the same role as social
framework evidence as defined by Walker and Monahan but varies in form
from their definition. Their definition also eliminates many of the most
difficult issues concerning the use of social framework evidence. Indeed,
insofar as evidentiary analysis is concerned, it is the precise manner in which
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L.
See also Brilmayer, W1obble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 376-78
(1986) (describing "process values" that tend to convert whatever result is reached by the litigation
process into a definitionally correct result regardless of its theoretical accuracy). But see Shaviro,
Statistical-ProbabilityEvidence and the Appearance ofJustice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 548-51, 554 (1989)
(questioning whether the goal of public perception ofjustice should or will support limiting the use
of statistical proof).
In his concurring opinion to a judgment excluding lie detector evidence by stipulation of the
parties, Justice Linde gave a related but broader description of the role of the jury in determining
credibility.
The institution of the trial, above all, assumes the importance of human judgment in
assessing the statements of disputing parties and other witnesses. The cherished courtroom
drama of confrontation, oral testimony and cross-examination is designed to let a jury pass
judgment on their truthfulness and on the accuracy of their testimony. The central myth of
the trial is that truth can be discovered in no better way, though it has long been argued that
the drama really serves symbolic values more important than reliable factfinding.
State v. Lyon, 304 Or. 221, 238, 744 P.2d 231, 240 (1987) (Linde, J., concurring).
86. In this regard, I have in mind expert determinations of credibility that are labeled not
helpful to the jury. If the meaning were limited to whether the expert is better able to assess the
truthfulness of the witness, I contend that the testimony would be helpful. I suspect that what others
have labeled "acceptability" or "process values" or "ritual" plays an important role here.
Nevertheless, one should be cautious in accepting such values unrelated to truthfinding. Such
acceptance poses at least an indirect threat to other basic values we espouse in a democratic society.
See Gold, supra note 9, at 405. Departure from the goal of scientific accuracy should be taken only
with great caution.
87. Walker & Monahan, supra note I.
85.

REV. 1357 (1985).
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the expert presents the social framework testimony that raises the most
complicated issues."" Walker and Monahan largely avoid these questions.
They distinguish social framework testimony from "clinical" testimony.
Social framework evidence in their view involves research that is largely "off
the rack" in the sense that it involves use of preexisting research studies that
are typically prepared separately from the litigation itself.8 9 And, critically,
such social framework evidence is to be presented in the form of instructions
by the judge rather than through the testimony of an expert.9 0 Walker and
Monahan believe that the variables that are used to produce the framework
are generally in the record or can readily be assessed by the jury without the
necessity of expert assistance. Where the characteristics are not so easily
established, they would permit expert testimony but confine it to those
variables that are either not in the record or not capable of direct assessment
by the jurors. The expert's presentation would remain separate from the
social framework evidence, which would be provided through jury
instruction. 9 '
By limiting social framework evidence to general data presented to the
jury in the form of instructions, Walker and Monahan remove from the
picture the majority of the most challenging evidentiary issues. They contend
that the social science research indicates that statistical evidence is not
overvalued by the jury.9 2 When such research is presented separately from
the expert's testimony and no longer carries the aura that may surround an
expert's performance, empirical research may well support this general
point.9 3 Their further limitation on the presentation of social framework
88. See generally infra Part IV.
89. The court in People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951-52 (Colo. 1987), approved admission of
testimony concerning the rape trauma syndrome under limitations like those suggested by Walker
and Monahan, although not presented in the form ofjury instructions. See infra discussion at note
184 and accompanying text.
90. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 592.
A major contribution of the work of Walker and Monahan is to open the debate about the type of
evidence social frameworks constitute and the process by which it should be evaluated by the courts.
They propose that social framework evidence should be viewed not in the narrow sense of
adjudicative facts that are particular to the case but somewhat in the sense of legislative facts that are
used by the court in its lawmaking function and are not limited to the individual case. They also
argue that courts should evaluate empirical research much as they evaluate precedent. Id. at 583-98.
See also Walker & Monahan, Scientific Methodology as Precedent, supra note 1.
Accordingly, when I refer to their view of social framework evidence as a narrow one, I do not
intend to suggest that their approach is a wholly conservative examination of the legal issues involved
in admissibility analysis. Theirs are innovative suggestions that raise challenging and difficult issues.
Indeed, substantial uncertainty remains as to whether courts are capable of evaluating such research
as they evaluate legal precedent and whether it is wise to accord such facts the longevity that is often
associated with legal precedent. Cf People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149, 549
P.2d 1240, 1245 (1976) (noting that restraint in admitting scientific evidence under the Frye test is
appropriate since the decision of the appellate court to admit such evidence remains binding until
the scientific community changes its attitude based upon new evidence).
91. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 567 n.23.
92. Id. at 592.
93. A companion question that must be answered, however, is whether the instruction format
for presentation of this information removes not only the objectionable features of social framework
evidence but also its effectiveness for the jury.
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testimony to jury instructions and the separation of such evidence from any
case-specific testimony by an expert also helps to limit the problems of
94
potential juror overvaluation of the evidence.
Walker and Monahan follow a consistently conservative tack in another
aspect of their argument concerning the introduction of social framework
testimony. Perhaps most importantly, they accept the analogy between the
use of frameworks based on group characteristics to evaluate the likelihood of
particular conduct by an individual and character evidence of an individual to
95
establish that he or she acted in conformity with that character trait.
Character refers to the individual's propensity to act in a certain way, while
social framework evidence relates to the behavior of a group having similar
characteristics to the individual whose conduct is at issue. In both situations
the purpose is to use general knowledge to predict specific conduct in a
case. 96 Walker and Monahan argue that
the policy concern that gave rise to a rule barring the admissibility of evidence of an
individual's "characteristic" behavior applies with equal force to the use of
information on behavior characteristic of the groups to which he or she belongs:
individuals should be accountable for their specific acts and not for their general
proclivities .97

The above position has implications that restrict the use of social
framework evidence. In general, character evidence can be offered in the first
instance only by the defense and can be used by the prosecution only in
rebuttal. Moreover, character evidence relating to the substantive conduct of
an individual is excluded entirely from civil litigation except in the
extraordinary case where character is at issue, and character evidence
concerning credibility can be used only after a witness' credibility is attacked
in a specified way. 98 The authors apparently accept those restrictions. 9 9
In suggesting how their proposal may be implemented, Walker and
Monahan make one final point of consequence to the general use of social
framework evidence and social science learning generally. They contend that
such research results are accessible to the courts and can be properly
evaluated and used by them. This position, while certainly not conservative,
is very problematic. 0 0
94. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 576 n.52. See also Vidmar, supra note 9, at 308.
95. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 581.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See FED. R. EvID. 404, 405, 608.
99. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 582.
They note, I contend erroneously, that "[t]his is the way, in fact, that the case law has gone." Id.
at 582 n.76. In child sexual abuse cases, for example, some courts have admitted social framework
evidence in contexts where character evidence would clearly be barred. See State v. Oliver, 85 N.C.
App. 1, 11, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1989) (framework
testimony used by expert to reach opinion that child was victim of assault where no defense attack
would have justified use of character evidence). See infra Part IV.A. I.
100. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 588-91.
Professor Lempert takes a very different view of the general role of social science research in legal
analysis. He contends that frequently the citations to empirical research are used in opinions to
justify decisions that would have been the same regardless of whether the research existed. He
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I have undertaken a rather extensive recitation of Walker and Monahan's
argument before beginning my analysis of the courts' treatment of social
framework evidence in child sexual abuse and rape cases because, to borrow
their phrase, their analysis creates something of a framework to use in
examining this special type of evidence. Their positions are interesting and
thought-provoking although, I contend, unduly restrictive in defining what
0
constitutes social framework evidence.l '
Certainly, if they intend to capture the forms of evidence that lawyers and
courts are using in applying group social behavior to decide the facts of
individual cases, they miss much of the richness in the actual world of the law.
The result of their argument is to make it easy for a limited form of social
framework testimony to be received. At the same time, however, their
approach appears to reduce the effectiveness of that evidence, to limit greatly
the situations in which it may be offered, and to render irrelevant much of the
more sophisticated analysis otherwise necessary for proper admission of this

evidence.
IV
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR ADMISSIBILITY ISSUES FOR SOCIAL FRAMEWORK
EVIDENCE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND IN RAPE CASES

When one moves beyond a limited view of the use of social framework
testimony and examines the uses that courts have made of variants of such
testimony in child sexual abuse and rape cases, the difficulties of application
of the legal doctrines governing admissibility become readily apparent. I

begin with a number of examples taken from child sexual abuse cases.
A.

Admissibility Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases

1. The Determination That the Child Was Sexually Abused Because She Exhibits
Symptoms Consistent with the Group of Sexually Abused Children. In child sexual
abuse cases, an expert may testify concerning what he or she identifies as the
"child sexual abuse syndrome," compare the alleged victim's symptoms with

those exhibited by children suffering from the syndrome, and, on the basis of
argues that the contributions of social science research to judicial decisions should not be
exaggerated and observes that the use of empirical findings by the courts is likely to be far more
casual than would be customary in the social sciences. Lempert, supra note 7, at 176-81. See also
EVOLVING ROLE, supra note 9, at 72-83 (examining institutional competence of courts to evaluate
statistical evidence based on case studies and finding tensions); McCord, supra note 14, at 33-34
n.46, 92 (non-legal, scientific materials are generally used poorly in judicial opinions because
materials are not typically found in law libraries and most lawyers have little or no training in
researching or evaluating these materials).
101. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 59, at 136-37
(viewing social framework evidence more broadly than Walker and Monahan and seeing no need
either for such evidence to be "off the rack" in the sense that the studies relied upon were prepared
in advance of, and independent of, the specific litigation, or for the evidence to rest upon a
systematically collected and analyzed data base as opposed to clinical insights of the testifying
expert).
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this clinical examination of the child, reach the conclusion that the child has
been sexually abused. 0 2 Should such testimony be admissible?
As developed above in connection with the evidentiary concepts of
helpfulness and relevance, three major issues with empirical underpinnings
should govern admissibility. 0 3 The first key issue is whether jurors have
prejudices concerning child abuse that require correction. Some research
suggests that the general populace is well informed about many aspects of
child sexual abuse. 0 4 However, courts rather consistently have taken a
different view.' 0 5 In order to determine admissibility, one would want to
know both the actual gap between social reality and community belief and the
level of misperception required before social framework testimony should be
0 6
presented. However, these questions are not easily answered.'
102. The testimony by the expert may be given in several different forms. I have suggested above
that the form of the testimony presents the greatest problems for admissibility. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
The expert need not affix the label "syndrome" to the set of behaviors exhibited by the group
that provides the social framework evidence. Likewise, the expert need not draw an explicit
conclusion concerning the individual's behavior in the case but instead may provide the data
concerning the group and permit the jury to make its conclusions, much as Monahan and Walker
suggest could be done through a jury instruction.
Finally, the expert may make no explicit
comparisons to a group but instead may render an opinion concerning the conduct of the individual
in the case based on the expert's general clinical experiences. McCord, supra note 6, at 9. Some of
these alternative forms of testimony present the dangers involved in the use of statistical evidence;
others do not.
As should be obvious, the issues differ dramatically depending on the precise character of the
evidence offered.
103. The relative ignorance of prospective jurors of the social phenomenon is a major issue
under helpfulness analysis. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The reliability of the social
framework evidence and the potential of the evidence to produce prejudice are important issues
under relevance analysis. See supra note°64 and accompanying text.
the
104. McCord, supra note 6, at 35 (While "there has been very little research on this topic ....
one study that has been done concluded that for the most part, the potential jury pool is surprisingly
well-informed about the topic of child sexual abuse.").
105. See, e.g., State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 607, 645 P.2d 1330, 1337-38 (1982) (common
experience ofjurors provides "a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility of [the]
witness," a child sexual abuse victim "whose claims were substantially uncorroborated"); State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984) ("The nature ... of sexual abuse of children places lay
jurors at a disadvantage."). Cf State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 11, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533, disc. rev.
denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987) ("The nature of the sexual abuse of children, particularly
mentally retarded children, places lay jurors at a disadvantage.").
As set out in the preceding note, Professor McCord recognizes that relatively little empirical
research has been done on public understanding of child sexual abuse but that the one study that has
been done revealed a "surprisingly well-informed" public. Nevertheless, Professor McCord argues
that "[c]ommon sense dictates" that expert opinion would assist jurors because "[t]o most people
the topic of child sexual abuse is unfamiliar and mysterious." McCord, supra note 6, at 34. See also id.
at 44-45. Interestingly, rather than his reference to empirical research, it is his general statement,
unsupported by empirical data and based only on his "common sense," that has been cited as
supporting the admission of credibility evidence in child sexual abuse cases. State v. Castro, 69 Haw.
633, 644, 756 P.2d 1033, 1044 (1988).
106. In the area of child sexual abuse, determining social reality is practically and conceptually
difficult. One frequent writer in the area asserts flatly that, "[a]s most mental health professionals
who are involved in evaluating and treating child sexual abuse in families indicate, there is no known
reliable psychological or physiological test or method for determining whether a person has been
abused ......
Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, Reforms, and Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 6
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 153, 179 (1988). But see Myers et al., supra note 6, at 52-62, 77 (arguing that
the status of social science knowledge has improved recently and that currently experts know a
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The second critical determinant of admissibility is the reliability of an
expert's determination from social framework data that a child was the victim
of sexual abuse.1 0 7 The reliability of such determinations remains unclear.
Indeed, some authors argue that the determination may not be reliably made
by experts in the field.' 0 8

Third, what, if any, characteristics about the testimony make it likely or
unlikely to be overvalued? Expert testimony on this issue typically comes with
no bells and whistles in the sense of the trappings of mechanical scientific
accuracy. It appears in familiar terms, but it does specifically relate to the
witness in the case and may well be more powerful than testimony about a
general group not connected by the force of the expert's direct testimony to
the conduct or condition of a specific individual. 10 9
substantial amount about the reactions of children to child abuse and can thus determine in many
cases that abuse occurred). For a discussion of recent research in the area of rape, see infra note 174
and accompanying text.
107. For a general criticism of the ability of experts to diagnose sexual abuse in the mine run case
based upon framework evidence, see Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical
Characteristicsof SexualAbuse Victims, 74 GEo. L.J. 429, 449-50 (1985) (authored by Andrew Cohen); see
also State v. York, 564 A.2d 389 (Me. 1989) (despite expert testimony that there are professionally
recognized characteristics of sexual abuse in children, court ruled such evidence inadmissible as
lacking proven scientific reliability); Comment, Syndrome Testimony in Child Abuse Prosecutions; The Wave
of the Future?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.J. 207, 218-19 (1989) (authored by Karla Ogrodnik Boresi). But
see Cling, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Medical Evidence of Non-Consent, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 243, 245
(1988) (arguing that "[d]uring the [acute phase], rape trauma syndrome is easy to identify and
reliably different from ordinary emotional responses of women who were not recently raped").
The cases that admit testimony of the expert about the event of sexual abuse frequently begin
with the accepted position that experts can give an opinion that a sexual assault occurred based upon
physical evide nce. See e.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383 n.4, 728 P.2d 248, 253 n.4 (1986); State
v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 & n.6 (Minn. 1982). They then apply that same reasoning to
conclusions based upon psychological evaluations. See Bailey v. State, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365
S.E.2d 651, 655-56 (1988); cf. Massaro, supra note 3, at 440 (drawing the analogy between physical
bruises and psychological bruises left in the form of the "rape trauma" syndrome); but see State v.
Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 384 n.6, 728 P.2d 248, 254 n.6 (1986) (distinguishing conclusions based on
psychological evaluations from those based on "observable physical facts").
Whether the extension from physical to psychological diagnosis is appropriate rests primarily
upon a judgment as to whether psychological testimony is like medical testimony in its reliability or is
significantly different. See Bulkley, supra note 106, at 176 (arguing that psychological theories, unlike
most medical decisions, are not based on empirically verified foundations, and, accordingly,
psychological experts should not be given the license that medical experts are given to testify that
sexual contact caused a condition). While some indicators do exist that help psychiatric experts
distinguish true allegations of sexual abuse from those that are false, those factors appear.to be far
from infallible. Green, True and False Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 4 J. AM.
ACADEMY CHILD PSYCHIATRY 449 (1986) (suggesting some of the circumstances under which false
claims of sexual abuse will be made and ways to distinguish between true and false claims); Terr, The
Child Psychiatrist and the Child Witness: Traveling Companions by Necessity, if Not by Design, 4 J. AM.
ACADEMY CHILD PSYCHIATRY 462 (1986) (same).

108. McCord, supra note 6, at 38. The argument is that the actual events involved in the case can
generally only be determined by relying on the statements of the alleged victim when psychological
diagnosis is involved. Determination of the events thus rests upon assessing the credibility of the
witnesses, which experts are not qualified to do reliably in most situations. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text & supra note 106.
109. In terms of the types of factors that commentators such as Professor Imwinkelried might
suggest, see Imwinkelried, supra note 60, at 273-74, some aspects of social framework evidence in
child sexual abuse cases increase, while others diminish, the likelihood ofjuror overvaluation of the
evidence. The testimony comes with no fancy computer readouts, for example, produced by an
apparently sophisticated machine-a fact that should lessen the danger of overvaluation-but often
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Some courts admit such evidence.1 10 On the other hand, other courts
have excluded entirely any opinion that the event of abuse occurred,
concluding that the testimony lacks scientific validity and may not be received
at all."' Another group of courts, while prohibiting direct evidence that
abuse occurred, has allowed some framework testimony relevant to the issue
to be admitted under various types of limitations. In these intermediate cases,
some courts permit the expert to testify regarding attributes of children who
are victims of sexual abuse and to identify the relevant characteristics of the
child in question. 112 Others more tightly restrict the testimony, either
prohibiting the expert from going beyond a general description of the
framework even to make the observation that the characteristics of the
framework group and the behavior of the alleged victim are consistent' 13 or
imposing more elaborate protections for the purpose of guarding against jury
use of the expert evidence to determine that abuse occurred.' "4
the expert relies on an explicit statistical data base, the testimony carries with it the force of the
expert's personal bearing and credentials, and the end product is a direct opinion concerning an
individual involved in the litigation.
If social framework testimony, even when based upon statistical studies that are explicitly
presented to the jury, is to be broadly admissible because it has little potential to be overvalued by
the jury, it must be that statistical evidence generally does not overawe the jury. This position,
indeed the position of some that statistical evidence is undervalued, see Walker & Monahan, supra note
1, at 576 & n.52, may lose whatever validity it has when applied to social framework evidence in
which statistics are made more vivid by application to specific individuals in the case. See Vidmar &
Schuller, supra note 59, at 152-53; but see Saks & Kidd, supra note 5, at 149 (arguing that laymen
cannot integrate statistical and anecdotal evidence and therefore tend to ignore the statistical
evidence).
110. See, e.g., Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 220-21 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3219
(1989); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 693, 760 P.2d 27, 32 (1988); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d
705, 708 (Nev. 1987); State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655-56 (1988).
111. State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1157 (Me. 1988) (no validation of indicators of sexual abuse
relied upon by expert); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 295-96, 667 P.2d 96, 100 (1983) (expert's
theory that sexually abused children manifest identifiable characteristics not shown to be
scientifically accepted).
One issue on which all courts agree is that the expert may not give an opinion based on the child's
testimony that a particular individual committed the offense. Glendening, 536 So. 2d at 221; Hester,
114 Idaho at 695-96, 760 P.2d at 34-35; Townsend, 734 P.2d at 708; State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151,
157 (S.D. 1985).
112. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (1986); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal.
App. 3d 1093, 1099-1100, 215 Cal Rptr. 45, 49-50 (1985); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609
(Minn. 1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 437-38, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983); State v. Jensen,
147 Wis. 2d 240, 259, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918-20 (Wis. 1988); but see Commonwealth v. Higby, 384 Pa.
Super. 619, 559 A.2d 939 (1989); Commonwealth v. Emge, 381 Pa. Super. 139, 553 A.2d 74 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 377 Pa. Super. 246, 546 A.2d 1249 (1988) (discussed supra in note 73).
113. Moran, 151 Ariz. at 385, 728 P.2d at 255; Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099-1100, 215 Cal.
Rptr. at 49-50.
114. In a group ofpases the California Court of Appeals has developed a somewhat elaborate set
of restrictions upon framework testimony of this sort. The court begins with the proposition that
under California precedent, framework testimony regarding child sexual abuse may not be used
because it is not sufficiently reliable to "predict" that in any particular case sexual abuse occurred. It
concludes that, even if the expert testimony provides only the general characteristics of the typical
victim of child sexual abuse, the jury may apply such syndrome testimony to the facts of the case and
determine that the child was in fact sexually abused in the case at hand. To avoid this danger, the
court imposes two principal restrictions. First, the prosecution must identify before any evidence is
admitted the specific myth or misconception the evidence is designed to rebut. Second, the court
must instruct the jury explicitly that the expert's testimony is not intended and should not be used to
determine that the victim's claims of sexual abuse are true. While not imposing it as an explicit
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2. Testimony That the Child Witness Is Truthful. Testimony by an expert that
the child is telling the truth can take several forms, just like testimony that
tends to establish that the child was the victim of sexual abuse.' t5 First, the
expert may testify concerning general characteristics of children that would be
supportive of the child's truthfulness, leaving unsaid the explicit opinion that
the child is truthful. Alternatively, the expert may testify directly concerning
his or her conclusion that the child is telling the truth. This difference in the
form of the testimony-whether a recitation of social framework evidence or a
direct statement concerning credibility-is generally a critical determinant of
11 6
admissibility.
a. Framework testimony supporting credibility. The key issues here are the
same as those described above with regard to the admissibility of social
framework evidence supporting the fact that a sexual assault occurred. First,
is there an enhanced danger in child sexual abuse cases of jury skepticism
regarding the child's testimony based on general social ignorance of the
phenomenon of child abuse? While some courts have stated affirmatively that
the answer to this question is "yes,"' 17 it is unclear that empirical research
supports that proposition." l8 Second, how reliable are the data concerning
the frequency of false claims of sexual abuse by children? The overwhelming
majority of those in the field support the credibility of children who make
accusations of sexual abuse,' 9 but this position is again not without its
opponents.

20

restriction on expert testimony, the court also noted that in the typical case framework evidence will
not be admissible in the state's case-in-chief because its basic function is to rebut an attack on the
victim's credibility. See People v. Leon, 214 Cal. App. 3d 925, 263 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86-87 (1989);
People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 391-94, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886, 889-92 (1988); People v.
Bothuel, 205 Cal. App. 3d 581, 587-88, 252 Cal. Rptr. 596, 599-600 (1988). See also Note, Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing the Effects of a Misdiagnosis in the Law of Evidence, 25 TULSA
L.J. 143, 167-69 (1989) (authored by Chandra Lorraine Holmes).
115. See supra note 102.
116. See, e.g., Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274-75 (Del. 1987) (expert may testify in general
terms concerning characteristics of children relevant to credibility but may not give quantitative
figures concerning those characteristics); State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 11, 354 S.E.2d 527, 533,
disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987) (statement concerning the fact that children
generally do not fabricate stories about sexual abuse found admissible whereas direct opinion about
truthfulness of this child would not have been admitted).
117. See Wheat, 527 A.2d at 273; State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Haw. 1988), discussed infra
at notes 153-55; State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220-21 (1983).
118. On the issue of public perception of the credibility of children, Professor McCord cites
conflicting research results on whether jurors are unduly skeptical of the testimony of child
witnesses. McCord, supra note 6, at 46. He observes that those who support the proposition that
juror prejudice exists do so largely on the basis of guesswork and behavioral research that is in an
embryonic state. Id. at 51. Some progress in laying the foundation for producing sound empirical
answers is being made with the conclusion that, as eyewitnesses, children "may not fare as poorly
with triers of fact as some past research and much folklore would suggest." Leippe & Romanczyk,
Reactions to Child (Versus Adult) Eyewitnesses, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 129 (1989).
119. McCord, supra note 6, at 38 & n.210.
120. See H. WAKEFIELD & R. UNDERWAGER, ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 301 (1988)
("Our own experience suggests that false accusations of sexual abuse have become more common
than is generally believed. As the publicity about child sexual abuse continues, the problem of false
accusations is likely to increase.").
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Assuming that the need for the evidence to correct juror misconceptions
and the reliability of the framework evidence concerning the infrequency of
false claims by children is accepted, in spite of the absence of clear evidence,
what is the likelihood of the evidence being overvalued by the jury? Here we
have a clash between fundamental, competing positions. Some espouse the
view of Professor Tribe that there is grave danger in combining statistical
evidence with softer credibility determinations made by the jury on the basis
of nonscientific observations because those latter "softer" determinations
may be overwhelmed.12'
Others take a different position about the relative valuation of the two
types of data. They contend that the "hard" statistical data are overwhelmed
by the "softer" but more vivid anecdotal evidence.' 2 2 It is not clear, however,
that in the credibility area jurors will be presented with vivid anecdotal
evidence contrasted with drier, less evocative statistical evidence. Evidence
concerning credibility is often indirect and circumstantial. 123 As a result, the
appropriate comparison is likely between "hard," though dry, statistical data
and the jurors' inferences regarding witness credibility. These inferences,

gleaned indirectly from the witnesses' conduct and their demeanor on the
stand, may strike the jurors as no more vivid but less reliable than statistically
based evidence.
Finally, the determination being made here-an explicit credibility
determination-concerns an area where values external to the goal of
accurate determination of the facts may be dominant. Courts have not
typically been receptive when presented with an attempt to change
fundamentally the method used by jurors to determine credibility. 24 Judges
and lawyers appear sensitive here to the possibility that a relentless effort to
determine historical fact accurately through scientific methodology will- open
the process to more effective attack. If expert testimony is received, critics of
a verdict reached would need only to raise doubt about the accuracy of the
l2 5
initial scientific proof to mount an effective challenge to the jury's result.
With regard to the admissibility of framework evidence regarding witness
credibility, courts reach disparate results. They reach these decisions in
121.
122.

58

McCord, supra note 6, at 55-58.
See Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly PreudicialEvidence,

WASH.

L.

REV.

497, 515 (1983).

123. When deciding issues of credibility, jurors must generally rely upon factors such as nuance
of body language and inflection and their judgment of whether the witness fared well or badly in
responding to cross-examination questions. When discussing these factors in deliberation, it is
unlikely that any of those factors is subject to easy description; indeed many jurors may not be able to
articulate at all why they have concluded that a witness is credible or incredible. Thus, I suggest, the
data on which credibility judgments are typically based should not be categorized generally as vivid
anecdotal evidence. Indeed, it may often not be apparent even to the juror who relies upon it.
124. Cf State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) ("The history of the
exceptionally fine jury system in this state instructs us not to tamper with the jurors' decision process
in such manner. . . . As applied here, [testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome] was inimical to
the proper jury operation. In spite of the phenomenal and constant accomplishments of science, it
does not seem fusty or anachronistic to preserve the integrity of that operation in a confrontation
with scientific opinion.").
125. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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apparent response chiefly to differing views concerning the impact of such
testimony on the jury. One court has held that an expert may not testify that
children almost never lie about sexual abuse,' 26 while another reaches the
opposite conclusion and admits such testimony. 12 7 Other courts have made
admissibility turn on the precise form of the testimony, 28 holding that it
must be general in form-not specifically connected to the child witness' 29
and not quantified regarding the percentage of child witnesses who are
dishonest 3 0 -or requiring at least that the testimony not directly state that
3
the child is telling the truth.' '
b. Direct expert testimony concerning credibility. Courts are on occasion
confronted by testimony from an expert directly giving an opinion that a
witness is telling the truth. While such testimony is not social framework
testimony as narrowly defined by Walker and Monahan, the opinion
represents presumably that expert's comparison of the child's behavior with
that of others the expert has seen personally or with the characteristics of a
group known to the expert through social framework data. On the basis of
some sort of comparison, which may remain unstated and implicit, the expert
reaches a conclusion that the witness is telling the truth.
The same variables should determine admissibility as with strictly
framework evidence. With regard to the misperceptions of the public, the
answer seems to be, as suggested above, that there is no clear evidence of
32
general skepticism by prospective jurors toward the child witness.'
Reliability of the testimony presents, apparently, rather substantial problems.
While experts may be able to verify the accuracy of sexual abuse charges
generally, determination of truthfulness in the individual case severely tests
the expertise of most professionals.' 3 3 With regard to the tendency to
overvalue, it is unclear that testimony of this type should be especially
powerful. In terms of the standard literature, the expert is using soft
126. State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986). See also Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138 (Ala.
1989) (court rules, inter alia, that it is permissible for expert to testify that children in general do not
fabricate reports of sexual abuse).
127. State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 11,354 S.E.2d 527, 533, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358
S.E.2d 64 (1987).
128. Tingle v. State, 536 So. 2d 202, 204-05 (Fla. 1988) (expert may help assess credibility
without direct opinion on credibility by explaining whether medical evidence is consistent with
child's story and by comparing patterns of child abuse victims' stories with victim's story). See also
United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1985).
129. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (1986); State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz.
472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986).
130. Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274-75 (Del. 1987).
131. State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 771 (S.D. 1989) (approving expert opinion evidence that
children who stated they had been sexually abused did not suffer from any symptoms of psychosis,
delusions, or hallucinations, which court appeared to acknowledge was "opinion testimony that the
victims' allegations were truthful," the court justifying admission partially on the basis that the
experts did not "testifty] that the girls were absolutely telling the truth").
132. See supra note 118.
133. McCord, supra note 6, at 44.
As discussed elsewhere, it would be difficult to maintain that experts never have any greater
ability than lay jurors to determine whether the child is testifying truthfully as to the allegations of
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information in.an area where the jurors will have some common experience.
34
The jurors should accordingly be able to accord it appropriate weight.'
Courts persist, however, in the view that such testimony presents a major
problem. 3 5 If there is rationality to their position, as opposed to simply a
hidebound reactionary opposition to change, it may be based on the mirror
image of the problem that commentators such as Professor Tribe contend

exists with statistical evidence. The expert has rather soft data, but the jurors
have potentially even softer information.' 3 6 In addition, the form of the
expert's testimony permits the expert's personality and credentials to be
added to the weight of the opinion. Moreover, relating the evidence to the
particular individual adds some concreteness to the testimony that statistically
based evidence typically lacks. Finally, the courts appear to have additional
concerns relating both to the importance of the issue in the litigation and to
37
values relating to the process of jury trial, discussed above.1
3. Testimony by An Expert Explaining the Innocence of Apparently Unusual Behavior.
While courts are divided on the admissibility of most uses of social framework
evidence in child sexual abuse cases, they have been in accord that testimony
is admissible by an expert in one class of cases.' 3 8 When the expert is
sexual abuse. See supra notes 45, 78 and accompanying text. However, the cases where the expert is
clearly able to give a reasonably reliable opinion are relatively rare.
The almost unanimous judicial response to exclude the opinion is probably a combination of the
relative lack of advantage these experts have over laymen in assessing credibility and the relatively
strong tendency ofjurors to give full credit to the expert. Also, judicial deference to the special role
of the jury in deciding credibility issues-what may be termed "process values"-almost certainly
comes into play. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
134. See Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 59.
The expert may, of course, combine an explicit statement of opinion concerning credibility with a
direct use of statistical evidence. In that situation, the problems of overvaluing are most substantial.
135. See supra note 81.
136. See supra text accompanying note 120.
137. Generally, the limitation on expert testimony regarding credibility rests in part on values
separate from the accuracy of factual determinations. When the expert gives a direct opinion
regarding the witness' credibility, his testimony threatens the core of those values. Admissibility of
such testimony would challenge some central tenets of the institution of the jury.
As a society, we pay dearly in terms of accuracy and speed of adjudication for using a jury system.
Were we to lose the finality of its judgment and its special acceptability as a consequence of an effort
to bring more scientific accuracy to credibility judgments, the loss would almost certainly outstrip the
gain, given the relatively low reliability of expert judgments concerning credibility. Cf Tanner v.
United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (court notes that allowing broad post-verdict inquiry into improper
juror behavior would lead to invalidation of some improper verdicts, but such an inquiry would
seriously disrupt the finality of the process and "it is not at all clear . . . that the jury system could
survive such an effort to perfect it").
138. See e.g., State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Me. 1988) (expert testimony admissible after
defense cross-examination to explain timing and sequence of inconsistent statements but such
testimony not permitted in prosecution's case-in-chief); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d
1215 (1983) (expert testimony explaining typical behavior of victim admitted after defense raised
issue concerning such conduct); State v.Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 250-52, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis.
1988) (expert's testimony that child's conduct was generally consistent with that of sexually abused
children properly admitted to rebut defense suggestion that charge was fabricated to deflect
attention from child's misbehavior at school). Cf Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 273-74 (Del. Sup.
1987) (in intrafamily child sexual abuse case, testimony concerning delay in reporting and
recantation of allegations of abuse admissible because likely to be seen by lay jurors as inconsistent
with truthful accusations and therefore to need alternative explanation); People v. Taylor, 142
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explaining that specific behavior, which the defense has suggested is unusual
and demonstrates a lack of credibility, is in fact commonplace among those
who have been victimized, the evidence is universally admitted.' 3 9
One of the major differences between this situation and those discussed
above concerns the relative ignorance of the population regarding a relevant
social phenomenon. In this situation, there are special reasons that the
evidence is needed to dispel a popularly held myth. Presumably the defense
made the particular attack on credibility to which the social framework
evidence responds because it believed that the jurors would agree that such
behavior would be unusual in a truthful person. Moreover, the defense, by
virtue of an effective attack, has enhanced whatever misperceptions originally
existed.
Reliability of the evidence should be relatively high because the claim of
the rebuttal evidence is rather limited. That claim is only that the child's
activity is not that unusual, which the framework evidence can readily
demonstrate from group behavior. Moreover, the claim of the evidence is not
that the behavior being explained itself proves the accuracy of the charges.
With regard to the impact on the jury, the testimony may involve some
statistical evidence or may rely entirely upon softer, individualized, clinical
results. The capacity to overwhelm would appear less substantial in either
case than in the situations discussed in the preceding sections. The lessened
threat to overwhelm the jury, however, has less to do with the form of the
testimony than the limited reach of the testimony. It does not claim to
establish that the crime occurred or even that the credibility of the child is
excellent. It only explains the proper impact of other evidence, placing a
defense attack in context. 140 Thus, the jury's essential role as determiner of
the critical values in the case is left substantially unchallenged.
B.

Comparisons Between Admissibility Decisions in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases and Those Involving Adult Victims

State v. Kim, "41 a child sexual abuse case, provides an excellent example of
judicial analysis and its reliance on assumptions about the nature of social
facts that should be amenable to empirical determination. In Kim, the
defendant was charged with having sexual intercourse with his thirteen-yearold stepdaughter. During the course of the cross-examination of the child,
A.D.2d 410, 418, 536 N.Y.S.2d 825, 831 (1988) (testimony explaining why the victim, who knew her
alleged assailant, did not immediately identify him was admissible because "the typical reaction of
victims of sex crimes is normally beyond the scope of the average juror's knowledge .... ").
139. Evidence in this category and that discussed supra in Parts IV.A.1 and 2, differs not only in
that here the defense has mounted an attack on credibility but also that the prosecution is offering
only a rejoinder and not affirmative testimony to enhance the credibility of the witness.
140. See supra note 114 for a somewhat elaborate set of restrictions on admission of framework
testimony to explain why the child's conduct is not inconsistent with being the victim of sexual
abuse. When used indirectly, framework testimony demonstrating that the conduct of the victim is
not inconsistent with abuse may be viewed either as supporting the child's credibility, the subject of
this note, or as supporting the proposition that abuse occurred, the subject of note 114.
141. 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
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defense counsel asked whether the child had "boyfriends," which the victim
ultimately acknowledged, and whether prior to the alleged assault she had felt
animosity toward the defendant.' 42 The court ruled that such examination
was a sufficient attack on credibility to permit rehabilitation under the rules of
43
evidence. 1

The prosecution then called a doctor, who was qualified as an expert in
pediatrics and child psychiatry. The expert testified that on approximately
seventy occasions he had assessed the credibility of children who were
allegedly the victims of sexual assault by family members. He compared the
behavior of the victim in this case to others he had examined, listed the shared
characteristics, and rendered the opinion that he "found her account to be
44
believable."
The court noted the sensitivity of expert testimony on credibility since, in
ajury trial, " 'thejury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses.' "'45
It repeated the statements of other courts that expert testimony as to witness
credibility might constitute " 'an invitation to the trier of fact to abdicate its
responsibility to ascertain the facts relying upon the questionable premise that
the expert is in a better position to make such a judgment' "146 and an
'invasion of the province of the jury.' ",,47
48 It
The court rejected any hard and fast rule excluding expert testimony.
adopted instead a flexible approach that balanced the probative value of the
expert testimony against any deleterious effects and excluded as not assisting
the jury any evidence failing that balancing process. 1 49 Under this balancing
approach, the court admitted the testimony.
The court relied upon its perception, unsupported by any explicit citation
to empirical evidence, that "the common experience of the jury may
represent a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility of a
witness" where the witness is a child whose complaint is substantially
uncorroborated. 150 It also noted that the expert had provided in his
142. Id. at 600, 645 P.2d at 1333 n.3.
143. Id. at 600, 645 P.2d at 1333.
Under traditional evidentiary analysis, credibility may be enhanced only after it has been attacked.
While this practice is frequently justified by the argument that the character of the witness is
presumed to be good until it is attacked, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 49, at 115 n.l,
the more accurate explanation is that "[tihe enormous needless consumption of time which a
contrary practice would entail justifies the limitation." FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee note.
Federal Rule of Evidence 608 specifies that "evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked." FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
144. Kim, 64 Haw. at 600-01, 645 P.2d at 1333-34.
145. Id. at 602, 645 P.2d at 1334.
146. Id. at 602, 645 P.2d at 1334 (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 229, 352
A.2d 30, 32 (1976)).
147. Kim, 64 Haw. at 602, 645 P.2d at 1334 (quoting Holliday v. State, 389 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla.
App. 1980)).
148. The court took guidance from the state's newly adopted evidence code modeled on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which, though not effective as to the case at hand, reflected the liberality
of the modern trend in evidence analysis. Id. at 604, 645 P.2d at 1335.
149. Id. at 603-04, 645 P.2d at 1335.
150. Id. at 607, 645 P.2d at 1337-38.
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testimony a substantial basis for his opinion. The court seemed to say this
basis demonstrated the basic reliability of his opinion and gave the jury the
capability to evaluate independently the quality of that opinion. The court
acknowledged that the testimony went to the heart of the jury's function in
assessing credibility.' 5 1 However, it concluded that this fact alone should not
bar admissibility given that modern evidentiary analysis no longer excludes
152
evidence because it concerns an "ultimate issue."'
Subsequently, the Hawaii Supreme Court held in State v. Castro 153 that Kim
did not generally authorize admission of expert testimony on the issue of
credibility. In Castro, the defendant was charged with the attempted murder
of his adult girlfriend. At trial, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined the
victim, inquiring into her relationship with the defendant and her sexual
preferences. The state, in an effort to rehabilitate the witness, called a
psychologist and elicited from him a favorable opinion on the victim's
credibility based on his evaluation of her made during"an examination after
the attack.
The state supreme court ruled this use of expert testimony improper. It
distinguished Kim from the later case on the basis that in Kim the common
experience of the jury did not provide an adequate foundation for assessing
the child witness' testimony. It relied upon a law review article by Professor
McCord for the proposition that child sexual abuse is " 'a particularly
mysterious phenomenon . . . seemingly inexplicable to most people' " and

'unfamiliar and mysterious.' -154 By contrast to the circumstances in Kim,
the court concluded in Castro that attempted murder was not a particularly
inexplicable phenomenon to most people. Under those circumstances, it
found the threat that expert testimony would cause the jury to abdicate its
responsibility for credibility determination too great to permit admissibility of
55
the expert testimony.1
Two cases decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court present a pattern of
decisions that rather resembles the one in Kim and Castro and, like it, depends
critically upon judgments about the state of juror knowledge and reaction to
testimony that should be subject to empirical research. In State v. Saldana,156
the court examined whether expert testimony was properly admitted when the
expert both (1) described the typical post-rape behavior of rape victims and
(2) rendered an opinion that the complaining witness was a victim of rape and
did not fantasize the rape.
151. Id. at 609, 645 P.2d at 1338.
152. Id. at 609-10, 645 P.2d at 1338-39. See also supra note 71.
The court dismissed the objection that the testimony was improper as to form under Rule 608(a)
in that while going to character it was not phrased in terms of a trait of character but instead was an
opinion as to believability on a specific occasion. The court viewed this objection as relating only to
phraseology and not to any substantive error. Kim, 64 Haw. at 609 n.14, 645 P.2d at 1339 n.14. But
see United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); supra note 76 and accompanying text.
153. 69 Haw. 633, 756 P.2d 1033 (1988).
154. Id. at 645, 756 P.2d at 1045 (quoting McCord, supra note 6, at 34, 44-45).
155. Id. at 644, 756 P.2d at 1043-44.
156. 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
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The court's admissibility analysis rested on the basic principles that
testimony by an expert must be of assistance to the jury and that its probative
value must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. 15 7 Using
these criteria, the court found both aspects of the expert's testimony
inadmissible.
Beginning with the first aspect of the testimony, which may be termed the
social framework testimony, the court concluded that the rape trauma
syndrome was not reliable as a scientific test to determine whether a rape has
occurred. 158 It asserted that the evaluation of the rape trauma syndrome has
not surpassed common sense in its reliability. 159 Thejurors were accordingly
just as able to evaluate the testimony as the expert.' 60 The court found
dangers from such testimony that required exclusion. It feared that the
apparent scientific basis for the testimony would create an aura of special
reliability and trustworthiness when the expert testified that the alleged victim
61
exhibited some symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome.'
With regard to the expert's testimony that the complaining witness did not
fantasize or fabricate her story, the court held the testimony inadmissible
because the victim exhibited no special characteristics that would justify
admitting testimony relating to her credibility. 16 2 Second, the court
163
concluded that the expert had no special ability to determine these issues.
Finally, it observed that the testimony concerned not the witness' general
157. Id. at 229.
158. Id. at 229-30. See also State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 346-47, 745 P.2d 12, 17-18 (1987);
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-250, 681 P.2d 291, 300-01, 203 Cal. IRptr. 450, 459 (1984).
159. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
The court gave no support based on empirical research for this position.
160. The court also contended that the evidence was irrelevant in that the issue was what
occurred in "this case," not in others. Id. It is hard to take that position entirely at face value, given
the general receipt by courts of framework evidence in other areas. In all these situations, the jury
makes reference to the facts of the framework cases or studies in deciding what occurred in the case
at hand. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
161. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
As noted above, see infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text, some courts have concluded that
the use of a scientific sounding term such as "rape trauma syndrome" itself contributes to a special
scientific aura. These courts often focus critically on the terminology of the testimony in determining
admissibility.
162. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 231-32.
The court appeared to be referring here to a body of legal doctrine that admits testimony
concerning the capability of a witness, who for instance is retarded, to tell the truth in contrast to
testimony regarding a witness' character or propensity to be truthful, which is generally excluded.
Id. at 231. See also supra note 74. The opinion is unfortunately unclear on this point, and the court
instead may have been referring to juror ignorance of the phenomenon of child sexual abuse, which
was not involved when the crime concerned the rape of an adult victim.
163. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 232.
The court considered that the expert was unqualified to determine both whether the witness
could differentiate between reality and fantasy and whether she was telling the truth. Id. It may be
that certain experts could conceivably make the first determination. See United States v. Binder, 769
F.2d 595, 604-05 (9th Cir. 1985) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (arguing that experts are permitted to
testify to the fact that a witness is capable of telling the truth even if not permitted to testify that
witness actually did so). However, apparently the particular expert in Saldana was not so qualified.
On the second issue, it is not clear that any expert is able to determine whether a person is lying and
certainly in most cases cannot do so reliably. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 106.
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tendency to tell the truth but constituted an opinion that she was on this
occasion telling the truth, and, as a consequence, the expert's determination
' 64
of credibility erroneously invaded the "sole province of the jury."'
In State v. Myers, 165 the Minnesota Supreme Court reached a different
conclusion than it had in Saldana with regard to social framework evidence for

child victims of a sexual assault. 166 It ruled admissible testimony of a clinical
psychologist, who had a caseload of sixty intrafamily sexual abuse cases, in
which she described characteristics typically observed in sexually abused
children and those she had observed in the complaining witness. 16 7 The court
both acknowledged that an indirect effect of the expert's testimony would be
to bolster the child's credibility 68 and accepted the proposition that the jury
might be strongly influenced by expert testimony on this score. However, it
asserted that the "nature ... of the sexual abuse of children places lay jurors
at a disadvantage."'' 6 9 On this basis it distinguished the result in Saldana,

where it had concluded that the jurors were as able as the expert to assess the
0
credibility of the alleged victim.17
164. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 232.
While the court did not mention the general restriction on testimony concerning credibility that
requires it to be received in the form of character testimony, the substance of its objection to
admission of the testimony here closely tracked that general evidentiary principle. See supra note 77
and accompanying text.
165. 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
166. In State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989), the South Dakota Supreme Court
approved the distinction drawn by the Minnesota courts in Myers and Saldana between admissibility
analysis of framework testimony in cases involving child victims and those involving adults.
167. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609.
While the courts are not uniform in their treatment, this form of the testimony-the expert
providing the relevant framework but giving no explicit opinion about the case-permits the
admission of the testimony in some jurisdictions. See supra note 114. But see McCord, supra note 6, at
58 (arguing that even such framework testimony should be excluded because of its extreme potential
to overwhelm the jury).
168. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609.
169. Id. at 610.
The expert also testified that it was extremely rare for children to fabricate claims of sexual abuse,
that the child knew the difference between truth and falsity, and that the child was truthful in her
allegations. The court ruled that the defendant waived his objections to these aspects of the expert's
testimony by the nature of his counsel's cross-examination of the victim's mother. Id. at 609, 611-12.
However, the court stated that at least the testimony that the child's statements were truthful was
otherwise improper since the expert's status might "lend an unwarranted 'stamp of scientific
legitimacy' to the allegations." Id. at 611 (quoting People v. Izzo, 90 Mich. App. 727, 730, 282
N.W.2d 10, 11 (1979)).
170. Id. at 610.
Whether the court was implicitly finding that the social framework evidence is more reliable as to
child sexual abuse than it is in the area of rape trauma is unclear. In Saldana, in the rape context, the
court found the social framework evidence to be no more reliable than common sense. Perhaps the
court in Myers meant to indicate no greater confidence in the reliability of the social framework
evidence in the area of child sexual abuse but believed that juror misunderstanding with regard to
child sexual abuse meant that the jury would not operate with its typical common sense absent
corrective education by expert testimony.
In Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 274 n.4 (Del. Sup. 1987), the court similarly limited its
admission of social framework testimony to child sexual abuse cases. Like Saldana, the Wt'heat court
based the distinction on the lack of reliability of the rape trauma syndrome. Wheat, 527 A.2d at 274
n.4. It also found that in intrafamily sexual abuse cases the complainant's behavior is, "to the
average layperson, superficially inconsistent with the occurrence of a rape ... [and] thus requiring an
expert's explanation." Id. at 273. Interestingly, in identifying the two areas where juror
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This last point is clearly one where empirical research could provide
substantial, indeed critical, enlightenment. Do jurors in fact suffer from more
substantial misperceptions concerning the conduct of child victims than that
of adult rape victims, or are they generally more skeptical of the former than
the latter? 17' It is hardly obvious that jurors would have great difficulty
understanding why, for example, a child would retract a valid allegation of
sexual abuse in the face of the prospect that "daddy" would otherwise be
jailed. It is equally unclear whether jurors would have more trouble
evaluating an explanation of such a retraction than they would have
understanding the fact that an adult female who claimed to have been raped
by an acquaintance did not flee upon the first opportunity or delayed
reporting the crime. Indeed, one might suspect that in the latter case such
superficially unusual conduct by an adult, who appeared much like the jurors,
would be more difficult to discount without expert explanation than would the
apparently erratic conduct of a child. Nevertheless, the court in Myers
purported to base its determination on the existence of a social
phenomenon-the greater difficulty of jurors in understanding child sexual
abuse-without providing any factual support for its position that such
17 2
difficulty existed at a particularly high level.
C.

Social Framework Testimony in Rape Cases

In determining the admissibility of social framework evidence in rape
prosecutions, courts reach widely varying results. These conflicting decisions
occur in spite of the claim that each court is responding to the same basic
concerns. Each, in its view, is basing its conclusion on the best available
scientific data and is attempting to establish historical events accurately while
simultaneously ensuring that the evidence does not distort the trial process
or overwhelm the jury.
A number of courts have rejected testimony concerning the rape trauma
syndrome. As noted above, the court in State v. Saldana, which is somewhat
representative of this position, took the view that testimony concerning the
rape trauma syndrome had "not reached a level of reliability that surpasses
the quality of common sense."' 7 3 This conclusion may implicate questions of
whether jurors have general misconceptions about reactions to rape and
whether the rape trauma syndrome is reliable in describing and identifying
the behavior of victims.
This is an area where research results are particularly pertinent.
Professors Frazier and Borgida have completed a study that suggests that
misconceptions need correction, the court did not rely directly upon empirical studies. Instead, it
cited a mass of decided cases that admitted evidence regarding delays in reporting the offense and
recantation by the child of allegations of abuse. Id. at 273-74.
171. See Leippe & Romanczyk, supra note 118 (suggesting that at least as eyewitnesses, children
may not fare so badly vis-a-vis adult witnesses).
172. 359 N.W.2d at 610.
173. 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).
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both of these concerns are met with regard to the rape trauma syndrome. 74
Many of the courts which have excluded rape trauma syndrome testimony
have reached a different conclusion than that suggested by Frazier and
Borgida as to the scientific reliability of the evidence. The view of the Saldana
court, noted above, that the rape trauma syndrome has not been scientifically
established as a reliable factfinding tool to determine if a rape has
76
occurred,1 7 5 is shared by a number of other courts.1

In addition, both courts that consider the evidence of questionable
reliability and others that do not, find the scientific aura of the term "rape
trauma syndrome" to be very problematic. 7 7 For example, in State v.
Allewalt, 17 the Maryland Court of Appeals disapproved use of the
terminology "rape trauma syndrome" because the term suggests the
syndrome is exclusively associated with rape but approved the use of an

174. Frazier & Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome
Evidence in Court, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 105 (1988).
On the issue of common understanding of the public concerning rape, Professors Frazier and
Borgida begin by noting that, in contrast to the relatively substantial body of research in the area of
eyewitness identification, little has been done concerning common understanding of the after-effects
of rape. Id. at 105. In their study, they administered a questionnaire to experts in the field of the
treatment of rape victims and to laymen. Their results showed a high degree of agreement (84%)
among experts with regard to knowledge about rape and a lower level of accurate information among
the control groups, composed of college students (58%) and non-academic university employees
(57%). Id. at 112.
Professors Frazier and Borgida concluded that their results support the admissibility of expert
testimony concerning rape. First, the gap between lay knowledge and expert knowledge shows that
potential jurors could benefit from expert testimony. Id. at 112, 116. Second, the high degree of
agreement among experts about the correct answers to questions concerning rape indicates that
"experts believe that rape trauma is distinguishable from prior problems," although there is no
indication up to this point that reliability has been demonstrated more directly by experts making
independent diagnosis that a particular subject suffered from the rape trauma syndrome. Id. at 117.
Frazier and Borgida note that, while common knowledge is by no means perfect (57-58%) and is
less than expert knowledge (84%), it is far from nil. As a result, they are uncertain whether their
research makes the case for expert testimony in the sense of demonstrating necessity for such
testimony. Id. at 116. Their uncertainty about whether their results prove that evidence concerning
the syndrome should be admitted is particularly appropriate if there are indeed negative
consequences in terms of confusion of issues or overvaluation that may flow from the admission of
expert testinony. See also Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 59, at 155-60.
175. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230.
176. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 250-51, 681 P.2d 291, 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 45960 (1984); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d
336, 345-48, 745 P.2d 12, 16-18 (1987); but see New York v. Taylor, 58 U.S.L.W. 2514 (N.Y. Ct. App.
Feb. 13, 1990). For discussion of Black, see Note, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An
Argument for Limited Admissibility-State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987), 63 WASH. L.
REV. 1063 (1988) (authored by Deborah A. Dwyer) (criticizing result, inter alia, on grounds that the
existing scientific research is better than the court believed it to be, and arguing for limited
admissibility); Note, "Rape Trauma Syndrome" and Inconsistent Rulings on its Admissibility Around the
Nation: Should the Washington Supreme Court Reconsider Its Position in State v. Black?, 24 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 1011, 1034 (1988) (authored by Tracy E. Watson) (arguing for limited admissibility if scientific
research improves).
177. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251 n.14, 681 P.2d at 301 n.14, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 n.14 (1984);
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 241.
178. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
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alternative, more neutral label-post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").'T7
Where the scientific aura is completely absent, even the courts that most
strongly oppose admissibility of social framework testimony in the form of the
rape trauma syndrome admit the evidence. They would allow either lay
testimony describing emotional or physical trauma'8 10 or expert testimony that
the symptoms observed "were consistent with a traumatic experience- even
a stressful sexual experience."' 18 1
Another group of courts has admitted expert testimony that explicitly
refers to the rape trauma syndrome. However, they have attempted in other
ways to deal with the perceived problems of the possible overvaluation of the
evidence by jurors and the arguable scientific aura of the social framework
testimony. In State v. McCoy, 182 the Supreme Court of West Virginia drew
what it acknowledged to be a fine line between admissible and inadmissible
testimony, holding that the "expert may testify that the alleged victim exhibits
behavior consistent with rape trauma syndrome, but the expert may not give
an opinion, expressly or implicitly, as to whether or not the alleged victim was
raped."' 83 In People v. Hampton, 184 the Colorado Supreme Court imposed
somewhat similar limitations. The court approved admission of expert
179. Id. at 108, 517 A.2d at 751.
The Washington Supreme Court in Black found for the same reasons identified in Allewalt that the
danger of prejudice was particularly acute when the terminology "rape trauma" was used but felt that
use of PTSD was an inadequate remedy. While the court's reasoning is not entirely clear, apparently
it believed the testimony, even in this form, would constitute an unreliable scientific opinion of the
defendant's guilt which the court viewed as improperly invading the jury's province. Black, 109
Wash. 2d at 349, 745 P.2d at 19.
180. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 349,
745 P.2d at 19. Bledsoe, unlike Black, may permit an expert to testify to the existence of any trauma
observed by the expert but would not permit social framework testimony suggesting the scientific
significance of that trauma. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
181. State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
182. 366 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988).
183. Id. at 737 & n.10; see also New York v. Taylor, 58 U.S.L.W. 2514 (N.Y. Ct. App. Feb. 13,
1990).
The result in AcCoy appears very consistent with the position taken by the Kansas Supreme Court
in State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 171, 689 P.2d 822, 829 (1984). In McQuillen, the Kansas court
narrowed somewhat a broad endorsement of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome given
earlier in State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982). The court stated that when consent is
the defense to rape "[t]he expert may testify that the patient/victim does possess and exhibit the
emotional and psychological trauma consistent with rape trauma syndrome." McQuillen, 236 Kan. at
171, 689 P.2d at 829. The expert in McQuillen did not testify that the victim was raped or that the
stress causing her disorder was intercourse with the defendant, id., and the omission of these points
from the testimony appeared important to the court's approval of its admission. See also Simmons v.
State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987) (psychiatric social worker could testify that victim's behavior
in giving false version of rape was consistent with rape trauma syndrome).
In Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1191-93 (Ind. 1989), the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that
testimony of this type- testimony concerning the relationship between the victim's behavior and
that expected under the rape trauma syndrome-could be used by the defense as well as the
prosecution. In Henson, the court held that the defendant's expert had been improperly prohibited
from giving the opinion that the behavior of the rape victim in returning to the bar where the rape
began was inconsistent with that expected. The supreme court concluded that such testimony was
clearly relevant to credibility. In light of its earlier approval in Simmons, 504 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1987),
of such testimony when offered by the prosecution, exclusion when damaging to the prosecution
constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1194.
184. 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987).
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testimony concerning the rape trauma syndrome to put "in context" the
alleged victim's delay in reporting the rape.' 8 5 Indeed, the testimony made
absolutely no direct link between the social framework and the individual.
The expert gave social framework testimony in a limited form similar to that
suggested by Walker and Monahan. The expert did not testify that the victim
suffered from rape trauma syndrome or that she had been the victim of a rape.
Indeed, the expert had had no contact with the victim and the testimony
concerned only the reactions of rape victims generally, not the particular
86
reaction of the alleged victim. 1

V
CONCLUSION

In general, I have argued that the admission of social framework evidence
should depend principally upon an evaluation of three factors: (1) the relative
ignorance of the jury of the social condition involved; (2) the reliability of the
social science research as to the social framework involved; and (3) the
prejudicial impact of the expert testimony concerning the framework evidence
chiefly in terms of its tendency to be overvalued by the jury. This system of
analysis unfortunately is not the one that has been applied by the courts.
Instead, they have resolved the admissibility issue by focusing most often on
one of these issues to the exclusion of the others or by using a mechanical test
such as the Frye test, which relates only indirectly to these appropriate factors.
A correct admissibility decision will not be decided by the answer to any
one of those three questions but will involve a balance among them. Juror
misinformation provides the need for the testimony. The value of the
testimony is related to the scientific reliability of the social framework. The
harm from the testimony results from the tendency of such testimony to be
overvalued. In a perfect world, these factors would be balanced against each
other and would be judged against the verdict that would have been reached
had no social framework testimony been offered. Finally, the benchmark for
admissibility would be whether the jury's decision after exposure to social
framework evidence more accurately reflected historical fact than its decision
made without having had such exposure.
Unfortunately, while social scientists may be capable of designing a testing
methodology sophisticated enough to produce the answers that I suggest are
required, limited resources render the development of such a research design
extremely unlikely.' 8 7 Given that reality, what should be the outcome with
185. Id. at 951.
186. Id.
While not explicitly requiring testimony to follow the form used in Hampton, the court, as in
McCoy, see supra note 182, seemed to rely upon the limited scope of the expert's involvement with the
victim in ruling the testimony proper.
187. With regard to determining the "truth" in actual criminal trials, as opposed to simulations,
we lack even the theoretical possibility of achieving that result except sporadically since the "truth" is
generally not verifiable. When, for example, a defendant confesses after trial or the prosecution
unearths dispositive exculpatory evidence, events provide verification of historical fact, but most
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regard to admissibility? One concern that cuts against admissibility is the
desire to preserve what I have suggested are additional important values
involved in trial by jury. Jury verdicts carry a stamp of finality and authority
beyond the mere result of a scientific test. The concern for maintaining such
a system appears to be at the core of the general reticence to receive such
testimony when it affects an issue of great importance in the case and
particularly when it directly affects credibility.
However, broad exclusion of social framework testimony is profoundly
conservative and suggestive of an anti-scientific bias. It should therefore not
be accepted without suspicion that exclusion reflects only a blind bias or the
inertia of the legal system and the traditional, legally trained mind. It must be
hoped that through careful research substantial progress can be made on the
empirical issues raised in this paper and that, both in terms of the form and
the substance of the admissibility analysis and the concrete applications of
social science learning in the area of jury behavior, we can make progress in
determining when social framework testimony should be introduced to
improve the accuracy of results while preserving other critical values involved
in the process of trial by jury.
Looking more specifically at judicial decisions in the areas of rape and
child sexual abuse, some relatively vague patterns can be discerned. First,
social framework testimony is more often received in child sexual abuse cases
than in rape cases. The reason is not entirely clear. As articulated in the
opinions, it relates to differing judicial assessments of the level of juror
common knowledge about the typical reactions of victims of child sexual
abuse as opposed to such knowledge about adult rape victims. This
distinction between the groups is not based upon documented social science
research, however. Instead, the outcome appears to be the product ofjudicial
bias that is more favorable toward child sexual abuse victims, given the

current consensus that there exists a terrible social problem in this area,' 88
than toward "alleged" rape victims.' 89 It is certainly hard to find any
often some uncertainty will remain that makes assessing the impact of social framework evidence on
the goal of reaching correct jury verdicts largely impossible.
188. While courts are often relatively candid in their result orientation when it comes to dealing
with child sexual abuse, few courts have been so open as the Wyoming Supreme Court in Goldade v.
State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984). There the court ruled that
hearsay statements important to the conviction of the defendant for child abuse were admissible. It
acknowledged that
[ilf the goal of our court were simply to pursue the common-law tradition of stare decisis, then
the cited authorities must be recognized as supporting the position of the appellant [to
exclude the statement]. In this instance, however, the function of the court must be to
pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment which afflicts
our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child abuse.
Id. at 725.
189. In the movement to reform rape prosecutions by eliminating evidence of prior sexual
history, one of the explicit goals was changing the law so as to take the decision concerning
admissibility away from judges, who the reformers believed were themselves subject to biases against
rape victims. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and FederalCourts: A Proposalforthe Second Decade,
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meaningful difference in the reliability of the research pertaining to these two
different fields. 190
Second, - direct statements concerning the credibility of witnesses are
almost universally excluded.' 9 1 Exclusion may largely be reconciled with the
scientific knowledge in this area, particularly the lack of support for the
general ability of experts to evaluate credibility in a reliable fashion.
However, the consensus of results also appears to be strongly influenced by a
deeply held feeling that this is an area where science should not intrude.
Third, social framework evidence, in both child sexual abuse and in rape
cases, is received most readily when the defendant suggests that the alleged
victim's conduct is unusual and that the conduct implies that the allegations
are false. Social framework testimony is then received to rebut or rehabilitate.
Several explanations for this result appear to be most likely. First, the fact
that the defense -believed the attack worth making suggests that juror
misconceptions likely exist, and the attack exacerbates any misperceptions
present. Second, the attack also makes the social framework testimony more
relevant by sharpening the conflict on an issue as to which the evidence is
most probative. Finally, some element of basic, unanalyzed fairness appears
to be operating. The defendant has a right to keep this potentially prejudicial
information from the jury, but in order to do so, he must leave issues as to
192
which it is particularly relevant out of the case.
Additional patterns result from judicial efforts to limit the danger that the
evidence will be overvalued by jurors or to reduce the aura of science.
Fourth, use of special scientific terms, specifically "rape trauma syndrome," is
disfavored or prohibited by some courts because of its tendency to suggest a
scientific determination that a rape occurred. Fifth, general testimony by
laymen or observations of psychological trauma by experts unconnected with
any testimony concerning a social framework is preferred to framework
testimony. Courts that impose these last two limitations do not dispute the
general relevancy of the social framework testimony. They are instead
concerned that the aura of science may cause the testimony to have an
improper impact upon the jurors that outstrips its probative value when the
phenomenon is presented in the form of framework evidence.
Sixth, social framework testimony that the jury can apply to the observed
conduct of the alleged victim is preferred to testimony by the expert explicitly
concluding that the victim is a member of a framework group. In the area of
190. See supra note 107.
191. The sole judicial dissent occurred in State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982),
discussed supra at notes 141-52, where the court allowed an explicit opinion as to the credibility of a
child sexual abuse victim because of its belief that such testimony was needed to correct juror
misconceptions.
192. The law has long taken a similar view with regard to the area of character evidence where
concerns about prejudice are much like those involved in social framework testimony. The
defendant has the right to shield from attack his character relevant to the conduct alleged against
him. However, once he uses character evidence to aid his case, the prosecution is permitted to
respond in kind. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1), (c) (permitting character evidence concerning the
defendant or the victim by the prosecution to rebut defendant's use of similar character evidence).
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credibility, this distinction is decisive. While only one state has admitted an
expert opinion explicitly supporting the credibility of a victim, several other
states have allowed testimony which accomplishes that result indirectly by
setting out relevant information concerning the credibility of victims
generally. However, even here the courts require care to be taken regarding
the form of the testimony; one state, for example, excluded the use of
numerical percentages to support credibility because of the scientific aura of
this technique.
The same concerns are discernable in admissibility decisions involving use
of the rape trauma syndrome to prove that the victim did not consent to
sexual intercourse. Testimony is more likely to be admitted when it omits any
direct expert opinion making the connection between the alleged victim and
the group of victims exhibiting rape trauma syndrome. As an extreme
example, one court cited with approval the fact that all information given by
the expert concerned the group, that the expert indeed had had no contact
with the alleged victim, and that the testimony could not be construed as
93
expressing an opinion about the particular victim.'
Finally, expert testimony that concerns one of the ultimate issues in the

case-whether the victim was raped, for example-is excluded in many states
while testimony is admitted when it serves only more limited functions, such
as corroborating the credibility of the witness once credibility has been
attacked. The centrality of the issue to which the testimony relates remains a
point of judicial concern, even though the absolute bar to testimony on an
ultimate issue has been removed. ' 9 4 The relative balance between probativity
and prejudice provides the basis of the decision, with the fear of overvaluation
being felt most keenly when the issue is central to the outcome of the
litigation.
Looking at these overall results, what can one say concerning their general
wisdom? At a gross level, they appear to be reasonable reactions to perceived
problems associated with expert scientific testimony concerning social
frameworks. They also suggest a cautious approach overall, which is largely
appropriate. The courts must perceive tremendous interest among the
scientific community in these social phenomena and are probably generally
aware that a substantial and growing body of scientific data has been
produced. At the same time, social scientists have not been able to agree
upon the degree of reliability of these data. Perhaps more importantly, the
research effort is in the early stages of understanding how to calibrate
precisely the impact of such data upon jurors. Uncertainty as to the impact is
a particular concern when one attempts to apply research results to the trials
of actual cases where advocates are bent upon maximum use (and indeed

193.
194.

See People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987), discussed supra at note 184.
See FED. R. EvID. 704.
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misuse in some instances) of the scientific testimony. Given these
95
circumstances, a cautious approach is no doubt the wisest course.'
When one looks to specific contributions of social science to the
adjudicatory process in this area, the impact appears to be relatively limited.
As noted above, courts are generally aware of a body of research on social
framework evidence, but their opinions betray only a vague understanding of
that body of learning. Courts rarely if ever make precise decisions on
admissibility based upon the latest scientific knowledge. The results of
studies filter into the opinion only occasionally and then probably largely in
conformity with results reached independently of the studies.
While not rosy, the prospects for the future hold some promise. During
the eighties much progress has been made in understanding and applying
framework evidence. Indeed, the vast bulk of caselaw discussed in this article
and much of the best research in the area is less than a decade old. However,
as I stated in the Introduction, we are not yet close to reaching answers to the
very complicated questions that must be resolved if social framework evidence
is ever to be rationally and properly admitted. The basic premise
undergirding modern evidence law is that broad, wooden impediments to the
admissibility of evidence are not approp5riate. Courts, as noted above, should
be cautious in admitting such evidence given the uncertainty about its
reliability and the potential for prejudice. However, there appears to be no
reason based upon our current knowledge and experience to create general
rules prohibiting admissibility of social framework evidence.

195. Take for example the excellent study by Professors Frazier and Borgida concerning social
framework evidence in rape cases. Frazier & Borgida, supra note 174. It is hard to interpret their
results as giving a clear answer concerning the extent to which evidence about the rape trauma
syndrome should be received. They found that potential jurors lack full knowledge but have some
substantial body of accurate information. When this insight is combined with the research results of
Professors Brekke and Borgida the picture is even more murky. They found that social framework
testimony has a variable impact on jurors depending upon the form of presentation. Brekke &
Borgida, supra note 59. Considering the studies together, one is left with no clear answer to the
question of whether the framework testimony should be generally admissible and, if so, what forms
of the evidence should be allowed.

